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Tämä tutkielma tutkii parodian ja tekijänoikeuden välistä suhdetta Euroopan unionin oikeudessa. Tut-
kielmassa esitetään myös, miten tätä suhdetta säädellään EU-jäsenmaista Suomen, Ranskan, Alanko-
maiden ja Yhdistyneen kuningaskunnan lainsäädännöissä ja verrataan myös EU-oikeutta Australian, 
Kanadan ja USA:n oikeuteen. Oikeusvertailun tarkoituksena on antaa kuva siitä, millä muilla tavoin pa-
rodian ja tekijänoikeuden välistä suhdetta voidaan säädellä ja antaa ideoita EU-oikeuden kehittämiseksi. 
Parodia ja tekijänoikeus ovat molemmat yhteydessä perusoikeuksiin EU-oikeudessa; parodia sanan-
vapauteen ja tekijänoikeus ennen kaikkea omaisuudensuojaan, vaikka sen voidaan nähdä edistävän 
myös sananvapautta. Parodian ja tekijänoikeuden välistä suhdetta EU-oikeudessa säädellään ennen 
kaikkea tietoyhteiskuntadirektiivissä. Sen mukaan jäsenvaltiot voivat asettaa parodiapoikkeuksen, joka 
kohdistuu 2 ja 3 artikloissa oleviin tekijänoikeuden haltijoiden oikeuksiin (kappaleen valmistamista kos-
keva oikeus ja oikeus välittää yleisölle teoksia ja oikeus saattaa muu aineisto yleisön saataviin). Poikkeus 
tarkoittaa, että parodian tekeminen ja julkaiseminen ei riko näitä oikeuksia. Poikkeuksen asettaminen on 
jäsenvaltioille vapaaehtoista. Tietoyhteiskuntadirektiivi ei kuitenkaan määrittele parodiaa. Muutos tähän 
puutteeseen tuli Euroopan unionin tuomioistuimen (EUT) tuomiossa Deckmyn ja Vrijheidsfonds 
(Deckmyn), jossa se määritti parodian itsenäiseksi käsitteeksi EU-oikeudessa ja antoi sille yhdenmukai-
sen määritelmän EU-oikeudessa. EUT pohjasi määritelmän parodian tavalliseen merkitykseen. Määri-
telmän mukaan parodiassa ”yhtäältä viitataan olemassa olevaan teokseen mutta poiketaan siitä havait-
tavissa olevalla tavalla ja toisaalta se on huumorin tai pilailun ilmentymä”. Tutkielmassa esitetään, että 
määritelmässä huumori viittaa humoristiseen tarkoitukseen eikä humoristiseen vaikutukseen siksi, että 
tämä käsitys on yhdenmukaisempi sananvapauden kanssa ja käytännöllisten syiden vuoksi.  
Jäsenvaltiot eivät todennäköisesti saa asettaa uusia ehtoja EUT-määritelmän ehtojen päälle, sillä 
muutoin muun muassa EUT-määritelmän harmonisointivaikutus heikkenisi. Joidenkin jäsenvaltioiden 
lainsäädännössä on edelleen jo ennen Deckmyniä olemassa olleita lisäehtoja parodialle. Niiden sovel-
tamisen Deckmynin jälkeen voi nähdä olevan ongelmallista ja sen laillisuuden epävarmaa.  
Ranska, Alankomaat ja Yhdistynyt kuningaskunta ovat lainsäädännöissään asettaneet parodiapoik-
keuksen, Suomi ei, jossa parodia on sallittu vapaa muuttaminen tai sitaattioikeus -säännösten avulla. 
Muista maista Australia ja Kanada ovat asettaneet lainsäädäntöihinsä parodiapoikkeuksen, USA taas 
ei, jossa se on sallittu fair use -doktriinin avulla, jota ei ole EU-oikeudessa. Australiassa ja Kanadassa 
parodian ehtona on vastaava fair dealing -ehto. Työssä esitetään, että fair use -doktriinin lisääminen EU-
oikeuteen voisi olla hyödyllistä sen varalta, että parodian tavanomainen merkitys muuttuu. Lisäksi työssä 
esitetään, että voisi olla hyödyllistä, jos EU säätäisi pakolliseksi jäsenvaltioille parodiapoikkeuksen aset-
tamisen, sillä se parantaisi oikeusvarmuutta EU:ssa. 
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This paper will examine the relationship between parody and copyright in the European Union law. In 
the paper will also be examined how the relationship is regulated in a few EU Member States (Finland, 
France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) and how the EU law compares to Australian, Canadian 
and US law. The comparison will be done to give a view on which other ways the relationship between 
parody and copyright may be regulated and to give ideas for the development of the EU law.  
Parody and copyright are both linked to fundamental rights in the EU law; parody to the freedom of 
expression and copyright essentially to the right to property even though it can be seen to advance the 
freedom of expression as well. The relationship between parody and copyright in the EU law is regulated 
essentially in the Information Society Directive (The InfoSoc Directive). According to it the Member States 
may set out a parody exception to copyright holders’ rights found in Articles 2 (right of reproduction) and 
3 (right of communication to the public of works and right of making available to the public other subject-
matter). The exception means that one can create and publish a parody without violating these rights. 
Setting out the parody exception is voluntary for the Member States. However, the InfoSoc Directive 
does not define parody. A change to the lack of definition was provided in the European Court of Justice’s 
(ECJ) preliminary ruling Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds (Deckmyn) in which parody was established as an 
autonomous concept in the EU law and given a uniform definition in the EU law. The ECJ based the 
definition on its usual meaning. According to the definition ‘the essential characteristics of parody, are, 
first, to evoke an existing work, while being noticeably different from it, and secondly, to constitute an 
expression of humour or mockery’. It is argued in the paper that ‘humour’ refers to a humorous intent as 
opposed to a humorous effect because this is more in line with the freedom of expression and because 
of practical reasons. 
Adding new conditions on the top of the conditions of the ECJ definition is not likely to be possible for 
the Member States as this would, for example, reduce the harmonization effect of the ECJ definition. 
Some Member States still have additional conditions for parody that existed already before Deckmyn. 
Applying them after Deckmyn can be seen to be problematic and it is uncertain whether this would be 
lawful.  
France, the Netherlands and the UK have set out a parody exception into their laws, while Finland 
has not where parody is allowed under a conversion done in free association or quotation right provi-
sions. Out of the other countries, Australia and Canada have set out an express parody exception into 
their laws, while the USA has not where parody is allowed under a fair use doctrine which does not exist 
in the EU law. Australia and Canada have as a condition for parody a comparable fair dealing condition. 
It is argued in the paper that adding a fair use doctrine into the EU Law could be beneficial in the case 
the usual meaning of parody changes. Furthermore, it is argued that it would be beneficial for the EU to 
set it mandatory for the Member states to set out the parody exception as this would increase the legal 
security in the EU. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction to the topic 
 
Parody is an interesting art form. First, it usually uses relatively much of another work’s material 
in order for it to achieve its goal. Secondly, it is often used to criticize the original work or its 
author or something unrelated to them which makes it a potent and important tool of freedom 
of expression. However, parody is in contradiction with the concept of copyright if it uses ma-
terial protected by copyright. Therefore, in many legislations such as, the Netherlands, express 
exceptions have been made for parody or it has been allowed in other ways. If certain conditions 
are met, parody does not infringe on copyright. In this sense, it can be seen to restrict copyright 
as copyright holders do not have a right to decide whether to allow or not a parody and they are 
not entitled to a compensation either. Legal problems can arise when it is not clear whether the 
conditions have been met and existence of meeting these conditions is challenged. 
 
Copyright restricts also parody. In the case of no exception or allowance for parody in legisla-
tion, copyright would be a major impediment to parody. Even though, in many legislations there 
are exceptions for parody or it is allowed to certain extent without express exception, if the 
conditions of parody are not met, a permission to use a copyright holder’s material for parody 
or a compensation to them is needed. For a parodist, there might be financial impediments of 
not being able to afford the compensation for the copyright holder or a lack of want in doing so 
or in many cases the permission might be refused. After all, not many copyright holders would 
willingly permit the use of their work in the purposes of mocking the creator of the original 
work or the work itself. Therefore, parody and copyright are heavily in conflict with each other.  
 
Parody and copyright can also be examined from the perspective of fundamental and human 
rights. Parody can be seen as a form of freedom of expression. Copyright can essentially be seen 
as an aspect of the right to property but it can also be seen to advance the freedom of expression. 
Thus, the conflicts do not exist just on the surface level of the concepts of parody and copyright 
but also on a deeper level of fundamental and human rights. 
 
2 
 
As said parody is a form of freedom of expression and also heavily related to copyright. Ac-
cording to Lee there are three big reasons ‘for treating parody as an issue that raises particularly 
pertinent considerations in the context of copyright and the freedom of expression, according to 
the existing literature.’ First, usually in order for the parody to be considered successful, it has 
to include a great amount of the original work; therefore, parodies are more in a risk of copyright 
infringement than other works that borrow material from other works.  
 
The first problem has been summarized by a student note according to which the problem with 
parody is to deal with parody’s nature with copying or imitating which is the very thing that is 
forbidden by copyright laws. The original work on which the parody is based must be able to 
be identified for the parodist to appropriately criticise the original work but the copying that is 
needed for that arguably violates the original work’s copyright. Michael Spence comments that 
parodies often take material from an original work for the purpose of critique for the work or its 
author. In doing so they often use the parodied work as a representative for a variety of values 
that the parody undermines and for which there are no appropriate alternative ways for expres-
sion. 
 
Second, as parody is many times employed as a way for a critical literary, political and social 
commentary, it is considered an especially valuable tool in regard to the freedom of expression. 
It enables authors to criticise a culture’s quirks and weaknesses. ‘It is the unforgiving mirror in 
which society is able to see itself most honestly reflected – warts and all.’ By ridiculing political, 
social or religious subjects, parodists create ‘healthy discourse and cultural self-examination’.1 
 
Third, because parodies usually criticize the original work, the copyright holder of the original 
work in many cases will not be willing to give a suitable license to the person wanting to create 
the parody. This means that it is hard for the potential parodist to create the work they desire. 
An example of this would be a British case called Williamson Music v Pearson Partnership 
which was about a TV advertisement which included a parody of the music and lyrics of a song 
in the Rodgers and Hammerstein musical South Pacific. Evidence presented that it was 
                                                 
1 Lee CREATe Working Paper 2015, pp. 107-109. 
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plaintiff’s protocol that permission would not be given in any case for creating parodies of nei-
ther the words nor music of Rodgers’ and Hammerstein’s compositions. The judge also noted 
that even if the permission had been sought, the permission would not have been given no matter 
the price. Furthermore, as parody relies upon audience recognising it, the window of opportunity 
for creating a parody is many times particularly short. For a parodist to have its satiric point be 
reachable, a parody must be published when a parodied work is still popular and topical. 2 There-
fore, a legal doctrine which does not allow the parodist to take material from present-day works 
restrains a parodist from commenting upon the present-day culture.  
 
The relationship between parody and copyright is an especially relevant and topical topic in the 
European Union law because of the relatively recent European Court of Justice (ECJ) prelimi-
nary ruling called Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds (Deckmyn)3 decided in 3 September 20144. In 
the case, it was established that parody is an autonomous concept of the EU law and a definition 
was provided for parody in the EU law. In the context of copyright, the Member States of the 
EU cannot provide a definition for parody that would be in contradiction with the EU law defi-
nition. The definition of parody (or the conditions for it) is at the heart of the matter when de-
ciding whether there has been a copyright infringement or not in parody cases. Therefore, in the 
European context, it is justifiable to focus the research on the European Union law perspective 
than solely on the perspective of national law(s). 
 
The technological developments in the recent decades has made the parody and potential con-
flicts with copyright even more of a topical issue. Even though there has always been a great 
deal of demand for parodies, in the past two decades its supply has increased in a major way on 
a different platform: the internet. The internet is full of ‘tributes, memes, remixes and parodies’. 
Quotation and intertextuality have become so omnipresent on the internet that many times they 
are said to be ‘a central pillar of the internet’s cultural logic’.5 One example of parodies pub-
lished on the internet are the numerous parodies made of a popular K-Pop song called Gangnam 
                                                 
2 Ochoa Journal of the Copyright Society of the U.S.A. 1998, pp. 558-559. 
3 C-201/13 Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds (2014). 
4 C-201/13 Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds (2014). 
5 Boxman-Shabtai Poetics 2018, p. 1. 
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Style by Psy.6 Some examples of these different parodies are Kim Jong Style, Mitt Romney 
Style7 and Nasa Johnson Style8. 
 
The making of parodies is not thus a new phenomenon; only a new platform, the internet, has 
emerged and consequently a number of parodies created has increased. The internet makes it 
easy for anyone with an internet connection to have their own parody published for the whole 
world to see. Making of a parody does not require much talent per se any more for it to have a 
chance for a wide audience, as it could arguably have required in the past when a parodist usu-
ally needed to have a contract with, for example, a book publisher or a film company to have 
their parody published. This unforeseen possibility for all people to publish their own parodies 
could mean that many more people are making parodies without the knowledge of copyright 
law considering the limits of acceptable use of original works in parody context and taking 
ignorantly potentially huge financial risks. Therefore, even though the increased possibility for 
publishing one’s own parodies can be seen as positive as it increases the amount of creative 
works published and enables greater freedom of expression for people, its downside can be the 
potential financial risks associated with it, especially in the case of ignorance of the copyright 
law.  
 
Related to this technological development, what also makes the relationship between parody 
and copyright topical in the EU law, is the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market 
which came into force in 20199. It is a directive which caused controversy and wide criticism 
from many different quarters. It was feared that one of its articles would cause the widespread 
blocking of memes (which may be seen as a form of parody) on the internet.10 Even though 
parody (and thus also memes) had an exception in the Information Society Directive (InfoSoc 
Directive)11, to the final version of the Directive a parody exception was added. As the directive 
                                                 
6 [https://www.theguardian.com/music/musicblog/2012/oct/19/gangnam-style-video-parodies-psy] (24.03.2019). 
7 [https://www.theguardian.com/music/musicblog/2012/oct/19/gangnam-style-video-parodies-psy] (24.03.2019). 
8 [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Sar5WT76kE] (24.03.2019). 
9 Directive 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related 
rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC. 
10 [https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44722406] (22.10.2019). 
11 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of 
certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society. 
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came into force this year, this is another factor showing the relevance of the relationship between 
parody and copyright in today’s European Union law.  
 
Finally, the relationship between parody and copyright is a topical issue in national jurisdictions 
as well, such as in Finland. Over there the Finnish Copyright Council (FCC)12 gave a statement 
in 2017 on an issue that concerned the copyright of paintings and parody. Another example 
country is the Netherlands in which there were two notable court cases a few years earlier in 
2011, Darfurnica and Miffy, that concerned the relationship between parody and copyright. 
 
1.2 Research problem and the structure 
 
Research problem of the paper can be broken into three questions: What is the relationship be-
tween parody and copyright in the European Union law? How is it regulated in a few EU Mem-
ber States’ laws (Finland, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom)? How is it regulated 
in a few non-European countries’ (Australia, Canada and the United States of America) laws 
and how their laws compare to the EU law and laws of the selected EU Member States?  
 
Chapter 2 will dive into the definition of parody which is, as was mentioned, at the heart of the 
matter when deciding whether there has been a copyright infringement in a parody context. It 
will give definitions from a comparative literature and legal (EU law) perspectives. A compar-
ative literature perspective will be given to avoid too one-sided a perspective to parody. After 
all, parody is also studied in comparative literature and other sciences being an art form and 
literature type; thus, providing a definition from another perspective besides legal gives a reader 
a wider perspective to the phenomenon of parody. 
 
Chapter 3 will focus on the regulation of copyright and parody. First, copyright and parody will 
be discussed from the perspective of fundamental and human rights. Second, essential norms 
for parody and copyright in the EU law will be discussed. Third, a legal case relating to the 
relationship between parody and copyright in the EU law (Deckmyn) will be discussed. Chapter 
                                                 
12 See the subchapter 4.1 for the explanation of the Finnish Copyright Council. 
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4 will firstly present how the relationship between copyright and parody is regulated in a few 
EU Member States’ law and their laws will be compared to each other and to the EU law. Sec-
ond, it will present how the relationship is regulated in a few non-European states and compar-
isons will be made between their laws and the EU law and the laws of the selected EU Member 
States. In Chapter 5 developmental proposals in regard to the EU law, i.e. how could the EU 
law regarding the relationship between parody and copyright be developed, are discussed. Fi-
nally, Chapter 6 will include the conclusion.  
 
1.3 Methods and sources 
 
The legal discipline that the paper is concerned with of which methods are employed, is doctri-
nal legal research. Furthermore, methods of a legal discipline of comparative legal research 
(comparative law) are employed. 13 Doctrinal legal research is also known as ‘theory-testing or 
knowledge building research in the legal academia’ and it is concerned with ‘studying existing 
laws, related cases and authoritative materials analytically on some specific matter’. Because its 
jurisprudential base is on positivism, “doctrinal legal research is ‘research in law’ rather than 
‘research about law’”. ‘Doctrinal legal research studies legal propositions based on secondary 
data of authorities such as conventional legal theories, laws, statutory materials, court decisions, 
among others.’14 
 
In the Finnish legal academia, the tasks of doctrinal legal research are seen to be interpretation 
and systematisation of legal norms. More precisely in its interpretation task doctrinal legal re-
search tries to find out what is the content of current legislation and what is the relevance of the 
material found in laws and other legal sources (such as the ECJ’s rulings).15 In this paper the 
actual methods of doctrinal legal research that are used are textual interpretation and textual 
analysis of legal norms and other texts.  
 
                                                 
13 Both doctrinal legal research and comparative legal research may be argued to be legal disciplines rather than 
methods. My viewpoint on the matter is, based on how they are usually defined (some of these definitions can be 
seen in this paper), that they are essentially legal disciplines. Thus, they are not described as methods in this paper 
as they many times are in Finnish law theses. 
14 Kharel (2007), p. 1. 
15 Hirvonen 2011, pp. 22-23. 
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In comparative legal research the aim is to compare national law to foreign laws.16 There are 
different viewpoints on what comparative legal research essentially is. The most relevant ap-
proaches to comparative legal research in regard to the approach taken in this paper can be seen 
to be the following. Husa understands comparative legal research as ‘a broadly understood field 
of legal study which can use various approaches based on differing methodologies.’17 Glenn 
argues that under comparative law there are many different methods.1819 
 
What is essential from the viewpoint of this paper, is to showcase what kind of methods of 
comparative legal research are employed in this work. In this paper, comparisons will be made 
between different laws regarding the relationship between parody and copyright, most im-
portantly between the EU law and the laws of Australia, Canada and the USA. An actual method 
how this is done is a textual comparison; comparing different legal texts into each other and 
finding similarities and differences between them. The purpose of comparing the EU law to the 
laws of the selected non-European countries is to showcase different ways the relationship be-
tween parody and copyright can be regulated and to give ideas for the development of the EU 
law. 
 
The sources of the paper consist mainly of the case law and laws of the EU and a few countries 
and primarily English-language legal research articles and books. Some Finnish legal research 
articles and books will be used as well. 
                                                 
16 Hirvonen 2011, p. 26. 
17 Husa Lakimies: Suomalaisen Lakimiesyhdistyksen aikakauskirja 2017, p. 1088. 
18 Glanert 2012, p. 62. 
19 Glanert argues in the same lines with Husa that comparative law is not a method itself. (Glanert 2012, p. 81).  
Mattei, Ruskola and Gidi see that comparative law may be used ‘for a variety of practical or scholarly purposes’. 
Some see it as ‘not only a method of thinking but also a method of working while some comparative law researchers 
see it as a ‘cognitive method’.  Gutteridge sees that ‘comparative [l]aw’ denotes a method of study and research’. 
Alan Watson sees comparative law as a discipline “which addresses ‘a study of the relationship, above all, the 
historical relationship, between legal systems or between rules of more than one system’”. Zweigert and Kötz argue 
that ‘[t]he basic methodological principle of all comparative law, from which stem all the other methodological 
principles – the choice of laws to compare, the scope of the undertaking, the creation of a system of comparative 
law, etc. – is that of functionality’. (Glanert 2012, pp. 61-63). 
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2. WHAT IS PARODY? 
 
2.1 Dictionary and comparative literature definitions 
 
Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines parody as  
 
‘a literary composition modelled on and imitating another work, esp. a composition in which the 
characteristic style and themes of a particular author or genre are satirized by being applied to 
inappropriate or unlikely subjects or are otherwise exaggerated for comic effect. In later use 
extended to similar imitations in other artistic fields, as music, painting, film, etc.’. 20   
 
Originally parody comes from the Greek word parōidia which means ‘burlesque poem’. The 
word constitutes of the parts para- (besides) and ōidē which means ‘ode’21 which is a type of 
song.22 Judging by the OED definition, parody is therefore an imitation of sort of another author 
or a specific genre. The parody takes the recognizable styles and themes of the author or genre 
and modifies them. These styles and themes are either magnified or used to ‘inappropriate or 
unlikely subjects’; in other words, used in another context. These are done in order to create a 
comic effect. It can be seen from this definition too why parody can conflict with copyright. 
This is because parody takes major elements from other works.  
 
In the comparative literature parody has been defined by Boxman-Shabtai as a specific kind of 
intertextuality, particularly ‘a text’s reliance upon the meaning structures of other texts’. In a 
broad way it may be defined as a type of imitation which leaves critical distance. Parody com-
ments on the way a text or genre functions. The way it does this is by merging ‘duplication and 
distortion’. In parody the most noticeable features of a work’s style and subject matter are taken 
and then by using varied ways of modification, it distorts the original and displays its flaws.23 
Another researcher Hutcheon defines parody relatively similarly: ‘repetition with critical dis-
tance that allows ironic signaling of difference at the very heart of similarity’. She also claims 
                                                 
20 [www.oed.com/view/Entry/138059]. (20.12.2018). 
21 [https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/parody] (24.03.2019). 
22 [https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ode] (24.03.2019). 
23 Boxman-Shabtai Poetics 2018, p. 2. 
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that parody also pays homage to its target.24 It is a notion that Chatman agrees, and he further 
claims boldly that “No one can deny the claim that parody is at once ridicule and homage”.25 
However in this quote also can be seen the difference between Chatman’s notion of parody and 
Boxman-Shabtai’s and Hutcheon’s. Chatman sees ridicule as an element that forms the essential 
part of the definition of parody which Boxman-Shabtai and Hutcheon do not. He justifies the 
essentiality of ridicule by two ways. One is by avoidance of using more unpleasant synonyms, 
for instance ‘derision’ (which implies ‘bitterness and contempt’), ‘mockery’ (which implies 
‘scorn’) and ‘taunting’ (which implies ‘puerile jeering and provocation’). Chatman argues that 
the ridicule that might want to be used to describe parody can be best expressed through words 
that encapsulate ‘the ambivalence of criticism and homage’. Parody should then be of a kind 
that even the target appreciates. Secondly, he argues that Hutcheon’s definition ‘imitation with 
ironic difference’ is altogether too extensive.26 
 
2.2 European Union law definition 
 
The European Court of Justice defined in Deckmyn what parody means in the European Union 
law. The definition is as follows:  
 
“…the essential characteristics of parody, are, first, to evoke an existing work, while being notice-
ably different from it, and secondly, to constitute an expression of humour or mockery. The con-
cept of ‘parody’, within the meaning of that provision, is not subject to the conditions that the 
parody should display an original character of its own, other than that of displaying noticeable 
differences with respect to the original parodied work; that it could reasonably be attributed to a 
person other than the author of the original work itself; that it should relate to the original work 
itself or mention the source of the parodied work.”27   
 
As can be seen from the definition, it defines the essential, crucial characteristics of parody; 
what makes ‘parody’ parody. It does not therefore give a clear-cut definition but aims to give 
                                                 
24 Hutcheon Cultural Critique 1986, pp. 185 and 194. 
25 Chatman Poetics Today 2001, p. 33 
26 Chatman Poetics Today 2001, p. 33-34. 
27 C-201/13 Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds (2014), paragraph (para) 33. 
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the essence of what parody is. There are two characteristics in parody according to the definition. 
First, ‘it has to evoke an existing work, while being noticeably different from it’. Therefore, it 
has to be associated or be seen in connection with another work but be at the same time distinc-
tively dissimilar. Secondly, it has ‘to constitute an expression of humour or mockery’. There-
fore, it has to be intended to be funny or humorous or mock something/someone. Mockery is 
defined by the OED as ‘derision, ridicule; a mocking or derisive utterance or action; an instance 
of mocking’.28 These two conditions then constitute, according to the ECJ, the fundamental parts 
of the concept of parody.  
 
What may be seen as problematic in the definition, is the fact it is unclear what ‘noticeable 
difference’ is. Noticeable refers to the fact that something is being able to be noticed but what 
level of difference needs to be noticed in parody before it is considered to be acceptable. This 
issue is left to courts to decide. The other problem is the fact that who should determine whether 
the work contains humour or mockery. Notions of what is funny or humorous are highly sub-
jective; it depends on the sense of humour one owns. In some cases, it probably is easier to 
determine whether humour or mockery element is present but in harder cases, it might be diffi-
cult. Should this be left to the judges to decide or should perhaps researchers of comparative 
literature or arts be consulted? These are difficult questions that the definition raises. 
 
Furthermore, the ECJ rules that the work does not have to be original, be associated with other 
than the author of the parodied work, be related to the original work or state the source of the 
original work. The ECJ also stated that regarding the use of parody, there has to be a fair balance 
between copyright holders’ rights and interests and those of the person(s) who rely on using the 
copyrighted work for parody purposes.29 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 [www.oed.com/view/Entry/120540] (15.11.2019). 
29 C-201/13 Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds (2014), para 34. 
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2.3 Comparisons between the EU law definition and the other definitions 
 
The OED and the EU law (or the ECJ definition) share similar elements in them. In both defi-
nitions another work must be the base for parody (‘evoke an existing work’, ‘imitate another 
work’) but it must be modified (‘being noticeably different’, ‘being applied to inappropriate or 
unlikely subjects or otherwise exaggerated’) and to contain humour (‘constitute an expression 
of humour or mockery’, ‘for comic effect’). The essential difference between them is that the 
OED definition is more specific; it sets out that it must be ‘the characteristic style and themes 
of a particular author or genre’ that are satirized, whereas the ECJ definition does not mention 
what must be the object of ridicule or mockery. This difference between the definitions can be 
further demonstrated by referring to the concepts of target and weapon parody30; the OED def-
inition seems to contain only target parody and the ECJ definition both forms of parody. 
 
The difference between the ECJ definition and the definitions of Boxman-Shabtai’s and Hutch-
eon’s is essentially the fact that the latter ones’ definition does not include the humour or mock-
ery as one of the constituent elements of parody whereas the ECJ definition does. In regard to 
the humour element, Chatman’s notion of parody is more in the same direction as the ECJ’s 
definition as Chatman sees ridicule as a constituent element of parody. However, the ECJ also 
mentions that mockery can be the essential element in the definition. Chatman then again re-
gards that one should not see mockery as an element in parody and instead finds that humour of 
a more appreciative kind is one that can be seen to be a part of the definition of parody. There-
fore, the legal definition by the ECJ is broader in its humour element than Chatman’s. 
 
Another crucial difference between the ECJ definition and Boxman-Shabtai’s and Hutcheon’s 
and in this case also Chatman’s notion of parody is the fact that in the ECJ definition is men-
tioned that a parody could ‘reasonably be attributed to a person other than the author of the 
original work itself” and it does not have to “relate to the original work itself”, whereas in the 
latter ones’ definition/notion of parody either comments on the way a text or genre functions 
(Boxman-Shabtai) or it pays homage to the original work (Hutcheon and Chatman) which 
                                                 
30 See the next subchapter (2.4) for the explanations of target and weapon parody. 
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implies that it must comment on the original work (as it is hard to argue why commenting on 
something else would constitute homage to the original work31). This issue also relates to the 
difference between target and weapon parodies. 
 
What may be seen as similar in the definitions can be found in what the ECJ refers to as the 
condition for a noticeable difference to the original work and the critical distance by Boxman-
Shabtai and Hutcheon. Both elements refer to a fact that the parody must be distinguishable 
from the original work. However, the latter ones’ critical distance element may be seen as more 
ambiguous than the ECJ’s condition for a noticeable difference, even though ambiguity is pre-
sent in the ECJ’s condition as well. 
 
2.4 Target and weapon parodies, satire and pastiche 
 
According to Spence parody can be defined in the context of intellectual property as ‘the imita-
tion of a text for the purpose of commenting, usually humorously, upon either that text or some-
thing else’. As can be implied from the definition, Spence suggests there are two types of par-
ody: target and weapon parody. Target parody aims to comment on the work or its creator 
whereas weapon parody uses that work to comment on something else.32  
 
The existence of weapon parody is not in contradiction with the ECJ definition of parody as the 
ECJ incorporates in its definition both target and weapon parody even though these are not 
explicitly mentioned. This is because in the definition it is mentioned that a parody could ‘rea-
sonably be attributed to a person other than the author of the original work itself” and it does 
not have to ‘relate to the original work itself’.  
 
However, Boxman-Shabtai argues in her article that parody is occasionally mixed up with satire. 
The difference between them, according to her, is the target which they aim to critique. Satire’s 
target is social conventions while parody’s target is aesthetic conventions. However, parody 
                                                 
31 It can be argued that it would be hard to find even target parody as paying homage to its target if ridicule is seen 
as an element of parody. 
32 Norman 2011, p. 228. (The original Spence article could not be found; thus, the use of a second-hand source) 
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many times ‘confronts social structures through aesthetic critique’. It seems what Boxman-
Shabtai sees as satire is weapon parody according to Spence’s categorisations. 
 
Furthermore, it seems that Boxman-Shabtai, Hutcheon and Chatman all see only target parody 
as parody, not weapon parody. This is because, as was mentioned earlier, their definition/notion 
of parody either comments on the way a text or genre functions (Boxman-Shabtai) or it pays 
homage to the original work (Hutcheon and Chatman). 
 
Parody differs from pastiche. According to Boxman-Shabtai both employ imitation in their ap-
proaches, but parody aims at critical transformation of its target whereas pastiche’s operating 
principle is using similarity and loyalty towards the work it modifies.33  
 
2.5 Examples of parodies 
 
As said, parodies vary nowadays in their forms; they can be for example songs, films or litera-
ture works. First, some parodies that have not raised major legal issues (if any) will be covered 
to give a wide glimpse of the various kinds of parodies made. One of the popular film parodies 
in the 2000’s are Scary Movie films which mainly parody the genre of horror films.34 An exam-
ple of a book parody is Bored of the Rings (1969) which parodied the popular Lord of the Rings 
book by J.R.R. Tolkien.35  One of the well-known music parodists is Weird-al Yankovic who 
many times parodies particular songs.36 One of these songs is Couch Potato which parodies the 
song Lose Yourself by Eminem.37 
 
As said the aforementioned parodies are not, however, ones which have caused major problems 
as regards to their legality. A parody that has, however, caused legal problems in the USA, 
having been claimed to violate copyright holders’ rights, is the song ‘Pretty Woman’ by 2 Live 
                                                 
33 Boxman-Shabtai Poetics 2018, p. 2. 
34 [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scary_Movie_(film_series)] (24.03.2019). 
35 [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bored_of_the_Rings] (24.03.2019). 
36 [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%22Weird_Al%22_Yankovic] (24.03.2019). 
37 [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Couch_Potato_(song)] (24.03.2019). 
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Crew which parodied the song called ‘Oh, Pretty Woman’ by Roy Orbison.3839 This parody will 
be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.  
 
Another example of a parody that has raised legal concerns in a different jurisdiction, Belgium 
and the European Union, is a parody drawing which bore a resemblance to a drawing which was 
on the cover of the ‘Suske en Wiske’ comic book entitled ‘De Wilde Weldoener’ and was evi-
dently claimed to violate the copyright holders’ rights. The dispute was taken to the ECJ and it 
gave the aforementioned preliminary ruling Deckmyn which is perhaps the most central EU law 
case regarding parody and copyright.40 In the Netherlands, legal problems have raised the Miffy 
parodies published on two Dutch websites which parodied the rabbit character ‘Miffy’ in picture 
books made by Dick Bruna. The parodies gave a rise to a dispute that was taken to Court of 
Appeal of Amsterdam.4142 In Finland, legal problems has raised a painting case which consid-
ered two paintings made by ‘G’ that resembled the claimant’s two paintings.43  
 
  
                                                 
38 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994), pp. 572-573. 
39 The parody and the original song can be listened to respectively on Youtube: 
[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rMqnPVU207M] and 
[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3KFvoDDs0XM] 
40 C-201/13 Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds (2014), paras 1-3. 
41 Guibault JIPITEC 2011, p. 237. 
42 [https://www.miffy.com/about-miffy] (25.09.2019). 
43 TN 2017:4. 
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3 PARODY AND COPYRIGHT IN THE EU LAW 
 
3.1 Parody and copyright as fundamental rights 
 
3.1.1 Parody as a form of freedom of expression 
 
As was discussed in Chapter 1, parody can be seen as a form of freedom of expression. This is 
also the ECJ’s stance on the matter.44 This way parody has a close connection to fundamental 
rights in the EU law through the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR). 
Beyond the EU law, parody also has a connection to human rights through the European Con-
vention on Human Rights (ECHR)45. Next, the freedom of expression will be discussed in the 
context of the CFR and the ECHR. The ECHR context will be provided as well despite the 
convention not being a part of the EU law as all the CFR articles that are discussed in this 
subchapter are based on the ECHR articles. 
 
The CFR was created ‘to strengthen the protection of fundamental rights in the light of changes 
in society, social progress and scientific and technological developments.’ The strengthening 
would happen as those rights were made more visible by creating the Charter. It includes rights 
common to the Member States and appearing in various treaties, charters and case law.46 The 
ECHR is a human rights convention created by the Council of Europe. One of its purposes was 
to strengthen the unity between the members of the Council of Europe.47 
 
Article 11 (the right to freedom of expression and information) of the CFR which corresponds 
to Article 10 of the ECHR48 and is identical to it word by word, is written as follows: 
 
                                                 
44 C-201/13 Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds (2014), para 25. 
45 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Social Charters 
adopted by the Union and by the Council of Europe and the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
and of the European Court of Human Rights. 
46 2012/C 326/02 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, p. 395. 
47 The European Convention on Human Rights, p. 5. 
48 C 303/17 - 14.12.2007 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, p. 5. 
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‘Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opin-
ions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority 
and regardless of frontiers.’ 
 
When the provision is applied to parody, every person has a right to make parodies (parody can 
be seen as a form of opinion as well) and communicate them to others and, in turn, others have 
a right to receive these (naturally depending on the conditions set out by the author of the par-
ody) without public authorities interfering to this.  
 
According to Article 52(3) of the CFR the meaning and scope of Article 11 correspond to those 
found in the ECHR.49 The limitations which may be placed on it cannot thus be greater than 
those regulated in Article 10(2) of the ECHR according to which: 
 
‘The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject 
to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are neces-
sary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public 
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the 
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information re-
ceived in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.’  
 
There are, thus, many potential reasons for why limitations may be imposed upon the freedom 
of expression, and consequently on parody. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
49 ‘In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those 
laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.’ 
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3.1.2 Copyright as an aspect of the right to property and as a right advancing the freedom of 
expression 
 
Copyright is a form of intellectual property.5051 As such it is seen as an aspect of the right to 
property in the EU law.52  
 
Article 17 of the CFR regulates the right to property: 
 
‘1. Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her lawfully acquired 
possessions. No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the public interest and 
in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensation being 
paid in good time for their loss. The use of property may be regulated by law in so far as is 
necessary for the general interest. 
 
2. Intellectual property shall be protected.’ 
 
The article is based on Article 1 of the Protocol to the ECHR: 
 
‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one 
shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions 
provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.’ 
 
As can be seen, these articles are relatively similarly formulated. 
 
In the second paragraph of Article 17 intellectual property is explicitly mentioned which high-
lights the importance of intellectual property as an aspect of the right to property. It was explic-
itly mentioned for the reason that it has a growing significance and because of Community sec-
ondary legislation.53 Community secondary legislation presumably refers to the directives 
                                                 
50 Kur - Planck - Dreier 2013, p. 3. 
51 Some others are, according to Kur - Planck - Dreier 2013 p. 3, ‘related rights, patents, industrial designs and 
trade marks’. 
52 C-201/13 Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds (2014), p. 5. 
53 C 303/17 - 14.12.2007 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, p. 7. 
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regarding intellectual properties, such as the InfoSoc Directive. The EU has also clarified that 
the guarantees included in the paragraph 1 ‘shall apply as appropriate to intellectual property’.54 
The intellectual property is thus as well protected as ‘conventional property’, namely physical 
property, is in the EU law. 
 
Copyright in the EU law can, however, also be seen as a right that advances or encourages the 
use of the freedom of expression. As the InfoSoc Directive allows an author to receive compen-
sation for the use of their work55, it can be seen for this reason to encourage authors to make 
more works or more authors to make works. If there were no copyright laws enabling an author 
to receive compensation, this could discourage making of works as an author’s income from the 
work could reduce when others could freely use their work. 
 
Copyright law in the EU can thus also be seen to encourage the creation of parodies in those EU 
countries who have the parody exception (or allowed parody in other ways) in their legislations. 
As parody is acceptable in the EU law and a creator of a parody knows, because of the other 
provisions in the EU copyright law, that they are able to receive compensation, copyright law 
can be seen to encourage the creation of parodies. 
 
3.2 Parody in the EU Law 
 
The InfoSoc Directive is a directive which regulates harmonisation of certain aspects of copy-
right and related rights in the information society. The Directive Article 4(3) also mentions par-
ody as one of the exceptions a Member State is able to set to the rights in Articles 2 and 3 of the 
Directive. The wording is the following:  
 
“Member States may provide for exceptions or limitations to the rights provided for in Articles 
2 and 3 in the following cases: …(f) use for the purpose of caricature, parody or pastiche.” 
 
                                                 
54 C 303/17 - 14.12.2007 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, p. 7. 
55 Essentially by giving rights (such as the reproduction right) to an author when they can decide that they require 
a compensation from someone using their work. 
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This is the only time parody is mentioned in the directive. Therefore, the information directive 
does not provide any substantial regulation on parody. The directive does not provide a defini-
tion for parody which is something that can be seen in other legislations as well.56 . However, a 
definition of these terms is something that might have been useful to ensure coherent and uni-
form appliance of the legislation in the Member States. However, this is not a problem anymore 
as the ECJ provided its definition on parody in Deckmyn as was previously discussed in this 
work. Furthermore, the article has caricature, parody and pastiche written in the same sentence 
which is typical of this kind of legislation.57 They are similar types of art forms; thus, it is natural 
to mention them in the same context. 
 
As Seucan has remarked, the word ‘may’ indicates the voluntary nature of the provision. Thus, 
the Member States are free to choose whether they provide an exception in the case of parody.58 
 
3.3 Copyright in the EU Law 
 
3.3.1 Background 
 
‘Copyright protects original works in the field of literature and the arts.’ Conventionally, these 
have consisted of writings, musical compositions and works of visual arts and other creative 
works. Copyright in the restricted sense and related rights constitute copyright in the wide 
sense.59 Related rights (i.e., rights related to copyright), which are also known by the name of 
neighbouring rights, are given to ‘performing artists, producers of phonograms and broadcasting 
organisations.’60 More recently, computer programs and databases have become under protec-
tion of copyright as well. Unlike some other intellectual properties, copyright comes into being 
without registration.61 Therefore, copyright is easily established, and the protection commences 
after creating the work. The duration of copyright is restricted. The duration of copyright in the 
EU is 70 years after the death of an author. It is long compared to other intellectual properties; 
                                                 
56 See Chapter 4 Parody in national laws. 
57 For instance, in the British legislature the same practice has been used. 
58 Seucan Juridical Tribune Journal = Tribuna Juridica 2015, p. 102. 
59 Kur - Planck - Dreier 2013, p. 241. 
60 Kur - Planck - Dreier 2013, p. 3. 
61 Kur - Planck – Dreier 2013, p. 241. 
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for example, the duration of patent is 20 years from the date the application was made and the 
trade mark’s registration lasts 10 years at a time. The durations of related rights are generally 
shorter than that of copyright.62  
 
At the moment there are eleven EU directives63 and two regulations64 regulating copyright.65 
Until the year 2001, harmonisation of copyright within the EU law had worked in a way that 
each directive had regulated either ‘individual categories of works (computer programs, data-
bases), individual rights (rental and lending; broadcasting by satellite and cable retransmission; 
related rights) or other individual issues (term of protection).’ The directives before the year 
2001 (see the footnotes on the current page), according to Statamoudi and Torrens, were already 
planned in the European Commission’s Green Paper on ‘Copyright and the Challenge of Tech-
nology’ and were included in the first of two sets of directives (‘first generation of Directives’). 
                                                 
62 Kur - Planck - Dreier 2013, pp. 123, 165 and 241. 
63 1) Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the coordination of certain rules concerning copyright 
and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission,  
2) Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of 
databases,  
3) Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of 
certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, 
4) Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights, 
5) Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on rental right and 
lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property, 
6) Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection 
of computer programs, 
7) Directive 2011/77/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2011 amending Directive 
2006/116/EC on the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights, 
8)  Directive 2012/28/EU Directive 2012/28/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 
on certain permitted uses of orphan works, 
9) Directive 2014/26/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on collective man-
agement of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online use in 
the internal market, 
10) Directive 2017/1564/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2017 on certain per-
mitted uses of certain works and other subject matter protected by copyright and related rights for the benefit of 
persons who are blind, visually impaired or otherwise print-disabled and amending Directive 2001/29/EC on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society and 
11) Directive 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related 
rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC. 
64 1) Regulation (EU) 2017/1563 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2017 on the cross-
border exchange between the Union and third countries of accessible format copies of certain works and other 
subject matter protected by copyright and related rights for the benefit of persons who are blind, visually impaired 
or otherwise print-disabled and 
2) Regulation (EU) 2017/1128 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on cross-border 
portability of online content services in the internal market. 
65 [https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/eu-copyright-legislation] (09.11.2019). 
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After these directives, a more comprehensive directive was created: the Information Society 
Directive. This directive with the Enforcement Directive, which is concerned with the enforce-
ment of intellectual property rights, were included in the second set of planned directives (‘sec-
ond generation Directives) in the European Commission’s Green Paper.66 After these came sev-
eral other directives such as the Orphan Works Directive which regulates orphan works (works 
of whose rightholder is not known or cannot be found even after ‘a diligent search’67) and the 
Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market which is the newest directive. Furthermore, 
in 2017 two regulations came into force. 
 
3.3.2 The Information Society Directive 
 
The essential piece of the EU legislation regulating copyright is the Information Society Di-
rective. According to Stamatoudi and Torremans, despite its name, the Directive’s provisions 
are binding also in the analogue world.68 This can be inferred from the fact that Article 1 men-
tions the particular emphasis on the directive is on the information society but it does not exclude 
the analogue world. Furthermore, the directive makes references to the analogue world in Article 
1. The InfoSoc Directive implements into the EU law the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and 
the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) both of which were decided in 1996.69 
 
In this chapter Articles 1-3 will be discussed. Other articles in the directive regulating of what 
constitutes copyright law are not particularly relevant what comes to parody; these will not be 
therefore discussed in this paper. 
 
Article 1 of the InfoSoc Directive regulates the scope of the directive. It states:  
 
‘This Directive concerns the legal protection of copyright and related rights in the framework of 
the internal market, with particular emphasis on the information society.’  
                                                 
66 Statamoudi - Torrens 2014, p. 397. 
67 Directive 2012/28/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on certain permitted 
uses of orphan works, Article 2(1). 
68 Stamatoudi – Torremans 2014, p. 397. 
69 Decision 2000/278/EC approving the World Intellectual Property Organisation Copyright Treaty and the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation Performances and Phonograms Treaty on behalf of the EU.  
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From this extract can be clearly seen the essential role of copyright in this directive. The frame-
work the directive is concerned with is the common market. Lodder and Murray argue that the 
focus is therefore on the economic aspects of copyright (and its related rights) although it seems 
to touch on cultural and societal aspects as well. Lodder and Murray have inferred the latter 
remark from the recital 8:  
 
‘The various social, societal and cultural implications of the information society require that 
account be taken of the specific features of the content of products and services.’70  
 
This seems to be a correct interpretation as Article 1 concerning the scope of the directive men-
tions internal market but not the cultural and societal aspects which seems to give the greater 
focus on the internal market. However, as the cultural and societal aspects are mentioned in the 
directive but only in the introduction, they seem to have a role of small importance as well. A 
particular focus is on the information society which is reflected in the name of the directive. 
 
Article 2 states: 
 
‘Member States shall provide for the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit direct or indirect, 
temporary or permanent reproduction by any means and in any form, in whole or in part: 
(a) for authors, of their works; 
(b) for performers, of fixations of their performances; 
(c) for phonogram producers, of their phonograms; 
(d) for the producers of the first fixations of films, in respect of the original and copies of their 
films; 
(e) for broadcasting organisations, of fixations of their broadcasts, whether those broadcasts 
are transmitted by wire or over the air, including by cable or satellite.’ 
 
Thus, it is concerned with the right to be able to decide about reproduction which the Member 
States are obliged to give to different parties: authors, performers, phonogram producers, film 
                                                 
70 Lodder – Murray 2017, pp. 60-61. 
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producers and broadcasting organisations. The right of reproduction is seen as ‘one of the most 
basic economic rights of authors and related rights holders’.71 The right is defined as  
 
‘the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit direct or indirect, temporary or permanent reproduc-
tion by any means and in any form, in whole or in part’.  
 
In the provision ‘indirect reproduction’ refers to, according to Statamoudi and Torrens, repro-
ductions that are many times those in which another means of communication is used in the 
reproduction process. They give a following example: instead of copying a sermon in a church 
by writing it, one records it, then listens to it and writes it down. Indirect reproductions are also 
those in which the work is transmitted or communicated to the public from the record.72 A par-
ody example of an indirect reproduction could be one in which a parodist first copies a book by 
an author X and then makes a parody of this copy.  
  
Article 2 also covers temporary reproductions. This partly contributes to the fact that the repro-
duction right may be considered to be a substantial and wide-reaching right. According to Walter 
and von Lewinski the main goal in explicitly mentioning the reproduction right was to clarify 
that this right entails temporary reproductions occurring in the digital environment.73 Lodder 
and Murray state that these temporary reproductions include even ‘reproductions in the cache 
or RAM (Random Access Memory) of a computer.’ Because every access and every use of a 
digital form requires many of these reproductions, the regulation could be seen as an overexten-
sion of the right. However, in Article 5(1) there is an exception to the temporary reproductions: 
 
‘Temporary acts of reproduction referred to in Article 2, which are transient or incidental [and] 
an integral and essential part of a technological process and whose sole purpose is to enable: 
(a) a transmission in a network between third parties by an intermediary, or  
(b) a lawful use of a work or other subject-matter to be made, and which have no independent 
economic significance,  
shall be exempted from the reproduction right provided for in Article 2.’ 
                                                 
71 Statamoudi – Torrens (2014), p. 401. 
72 Statamoudi – Torrens 2014, p. 402. 
73 Walter - von Lewinski 2010, p. 964. 
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The 5(1) a covers copies made during an internet transmission process which enable an efficient 
internet usage. It refers to ‘transmissions between networks, servers or routers of internet service 
providers’ where several copies are created to make the transmission process easier, and which 
are either not stored or are stored temporarily and solely in the process of such transmission. 
The 5(1) b covers copies made in the process of doing a lawful activity. Statamoudi and Torrens 
give an example of copies being created in the RAM memory of a computer so that one can 
listen to a music track bought legally in an online store. These are not actions that have inde-
pendent economic significance.74 In the parody context, temporary reproductions could also be 
made for example when one is researching material for a parody from the internet. Statamoudi 
and Torrens claim that these exceptions are made to avoid needless expansion of the reproduc-
tion right and to exclude actions which are seen to be only use of the work.75 
 
However, Lodder and Murray see this method of first stretching the right very wide and then 
limiting it, as abnormal.76 It seems to be a redundant and unnecessarily complex way of regula-
tion indeed; it would be clearer to immediately set the right as wide as one intends without 
having to limit it in another article.  
 
The provision includes reproductions ‘by any means and in any form’. This means that both 
analogue and digital reproductions of the work are under this regulation regardless of the form 
(analogue or digital) of the original work and the form the reproduction takes (digital or ana-
logue). Also, the original work or the reproduction may be of any digital form or made into any 
material carrier, such as when an art piece made of wood is photographed and uploaded to the 
internet and after that made into an art piece made of stone.77 This referral to any means and any 
form seems to aim to reduce evading adherence to the provision by making claims that there has 
not been a copyright violation because of a different format or because copying was done by 
unusual means. These claims could possibly be seen if this provision was not made. In a parody 
context, an example of the situation falling under this provision could be one where an original 
                                                 
74 Statamoudi – Torrens 2014, p. 403. 
75 Statamoudi – Torrens 2014, pp. 403-404. 
76 Lodder – Murray 2017, pp. 64-65. 
77 Statamoudi – Torrens 2014, p. 402. 
25 
 
work was made in an analogue form, such as a book, and a parody is made into a digital form, 
such as a video which is uploaded on to the internet.  
 
The provision also caters reproductions done either ‘in whole’ or ‘in part’. Partial reproductions 
are considered reproductions particularly in jurisdictions which do not demand a considerable 
part of the work to be reproduced. In this regard, Statamoudi and Torrens claim that ‘even music, 
video or news sampling may be considered a reproduction’.78 This seems a correct interpretation 
as a sample of, for example a song, is essentially a part of the whole song. However, it is unclear 
how long a sample or a clip would have to be in order for it to be considered a reproduction. 
Hypothetically speaking, is a one second sample from a song enough to constitute a reproduc-
tion? If we interpret the ‘in part’ literally, there would technically not be a minimum limit as to 
the duration of the sample in order for it to be considered a reproduction. A partial reproduction 
perspective is relevant in the context of parodies too, as parodies always reproduce parts from 
the original work. However, if too much is reproduced, this would be seen as an infringement 
on copyright. 
 
Article 3 considers ‘right of communication to the public of works and right of making available 
to the public other subject-matter’. It is clear that if parody fulfils the conditions of parody set 
out by the ECJ, it has had a right of reproduction and thus it follows that the author of parody 
has then a right of communication and making available as well. This is because the parody 
exception considers both Article 2 and 3 and reproduction phase naturally has to come first. 
Article 3 is presented here in order to provide a reader an image what kind of rights under that 
article an author of an lawful parody has an exception to or, to put in another way, what an 
author of a legitimate parody has a right to. On the other hand, presentation of Article 3 also 
provides the reader an insight what kind of rights authors of illegitimate parodies or others who 
communicate these to the public are violating. Article 3 states: 
 
‘1. Member States shall provide authors with the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit any 
communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless means, including the making 
                                                 
78 Statamoudi – Torrens 2014, p. 404.  
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available to the public of their works in such a way that members of the public may access them 
from a place and at a time individually chosen by them. 
 
2. Member States shall provide for the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit the making avail-
able to the public, by wire or wireless means, in such a way that members of the public may 
access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by them: 
(a) for performers, of fixations of their performances; 
(b) for phonogram producers, of their phonograms; 
(c) for the producers of the first fixations of films, of the original and copies of their films; 
(d) for broadcasting organisations, of fixations of their broadcasts, whether these broadcasts are 
transmitted by wire or over the air, including by cable or satellite. 
 
3. The rights referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not be exhausted by any act of communica-
tion to the public or making available to the public as set out in this Article.’ 
 
The article, which is in conformity with Article 8 of the WPPT79, establishes a comprehensive 
right for authors to authorise or prohibit the communication to the public.80 There is no defini-
tion for an author in the Directive. Thus, anyone considered an author under a national law of a 
Member State is covered by the article. 
 
According to the InfoSoc Directive Recital 23 the right of communication to the public should 
be comprehended broadly by including all communication to the public who are not present at 
the location where the communication originates. It should cover ‘any - transmission or retrans-
mission of a work to the public by wire or wireless means, including broadcasting.’ The right 
does not include other acts according to the recital. Because of the right’s broad nature, 
Statamoudi and Torrens view the right of communication as an umbrella term. They also remark 
that some level of transmission is essential for the communication to the public to be considered 
to have happened.81 This is relatively self-explanatory as the Recital 23 states that the public 
needs to be in a different location than where the communication originates from in order for 
                                                 
79 ‘(1) Performers shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing the making available to the public of the original 
and copies of their performances fixed in phonograms through sale or other transfer of ownership.’ 
80 Kur - Planck - Dreier 2013, p. 66.  
81 Statamoudi - Torrens 2014, p. 408. 
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the communication to the public to be considered to have taken place. This can only be achieved 
by some sort of means of transmission.  
 
The right of communication contains ‘TV and radio broadcasting, internetTV and radio, simul-
casting, webcasting, streaming, near-video-ondemand (NVOD), pay-per-view, near-on-de-
mand-pay TV, podcasting as well as cable and online transmissions in general.’ Only providing 
physical facilities for enabling or making a communication to the public does not comprise a 
communication to the public.82 We could think hypothetically that a provision of physical facil-
ities, such as an ISP connection, for an author of a parody whose parody does not fulfill the 
conditions of parody, would not comprise a communication to the public itself. 
 
The article does not cover then situations where communication is done at the same place and 
time as where the public is. This is seen as public performance, recitation or display.8384 It is a 
situation where both the reproduction and communication happen simultaneously. From the 
perspective of parody, even a parody that would not fulfil the conditions for parody and thus 
would not have reproduction right either, would be acceptable to be performed publicly at the 
same location and time as where the public is. 
 
The right of ‘making available’ is also included in the ‘communication to the public’. 
Statamoudi and Torrens argue that this means that when interpreting the former, the interpreta-
tion should be done consistently with the communication right, and that the making available 
right is regulated with the same limitations and exceptions. What is distinctive of this right is 
that works (or subject matter) are made available in a way that members of the public are able 
to access them where and when they choose (on demand). The provision does not demand that 
the public is addressed at the same time, or that the public is assembled in a certain place or that 
a pre-determined programme is supplied. It is not relevant in which form works are made avail-
able. They may be in a downloadable form or streamed.  
 
                                                 
82 Statamoudi - Torrens 2014, p. 409-410. 
83 Statamoudi - Torrens 2014, p. 409. 
84 This was categorically confirmed by the ECJ in ‘the joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 Football Association 
Premier League and Others and in Case C-283/10, Circul Globus Bucureşti’, (Lodder - Murray 2017, p. 67). 
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The provision is also ‘technologically neutral’ in a way that it is not relevant which technological 
device a person uses to access a work, be it a mobile phone, tablet or computer. Also, an internet 
connection type, for instance a wireless or wired, is not relevant either.85 
 
Furthermore, the public does not in actuality need to access the work. In the ECJ judgement 
SGAE, it was considered adequate in order for an act of communication to the public happen, 
that the work is made available to the public in a manner that the persons constituting that public 
are able to access it, and it was not determining whether the public in reality had access to the 
work by turning on the television.86 What is thus essential is ‘the act of providing the work to 
the public’ and the possibility of them to access the work when they want.87 This means that the 
right of making available is indeed very wide if the mere possibility of a public accessing a work 
is enough to constitute an act of communication. However, this is understandable as the article’s 
purpose is to discourage and prevent an unauthorised communication of copyright-protected 
works to the public and in some cases, it might be hard to prove whether the public have in 
actuality accessed a work or not. If the mere possibility of a public accessing a work was not 
considered an act of communication, this could mean that the numbers of occasions where the 
article is violated would increase.  
 
The number of times a work is in reality accessed or the type of use (for instance viewing, 
listening or downloading) is not relevant. The right only applies for the person (or entity) that 
makes the work available to the public and not for a member of the public who accesses it.  
 
The right of making available includes all on-demand services, for instance video on demand, 
pay per view TV, online databases of, for instance of films or music tracks, which one can access 
with the help of a search engine or special software and selects when and where to use it. Pod-
casts are also covered by the right. Statamoudi and Torrens claim also that computer programs 
and copyright databases are covered under the right as well.88 
 
                                                 
85 Statamoudi - Torrens 2014, p. 411-412. 
86 C-306/05 SGAE (2006), para. 36. 
87 Statamoudi - Torrens 2014, p. 412. 
88 Statamoudi - Torrens 2014, p. 412 and 414. 
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An author of a work or a legitimate parody thus has a very wide right of authorising or prohib-
iting the communication to the public and making it available. 
  
3.3.3 The Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market 
 
The Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market is a directive of which proposal version 
especially caused controversy and wide criticism from social media users, academics and tech-
nology leaders before the voting took place. There were two articles causing the criticism: Ar-
ticles 11 (in the final version Article 15) and 13 (in the final version Article 17).89 Article 11 
was about compensation for the use of press publications. Article 13, which was relevant from 
the perspective of parodies published on the internet, stated:  
 
‘An online content sharing service provider shall obtain an authorisation from the rightholders 
referred to in Article 3(1) and (2) of Directive 2001/29/EC in order to communicate or make 
available to the public works or other subject matter. Where no such authorisation has been 
obtained, the service provider shall prevent the availability on its service of those works and 
other subject matter.’90 
 
It was feared that the article would cause the content sharing service providers to adopt auto-
matic filters to block all copyrighted material and consequently block also legal usages of cop-
yrighted material such as parodies and memes which can be considered a form of parody and 
thus allowed because of the parody exception in the InfoSoc Directive.91 After all, memes and 
parodies are a huge part of the internet world today and blocking these would have major con-
sequences for many internet users.  
 
In the final version of the Directive which was passed on the European Parliament, Article 17 
states: 
 
                                                 
89 [https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44722406] (22.10.2019). 
90 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on copyright in the Digital Single Market 
9134/18. 
91 [https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-44412025] (22.10.2019). 
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‘1. An online content-sharing service provider shall therefore obtain an authorisation from the 
rightholders referred to in Article 3(1) and (2) of Directive 2001/29/EC, for instance by conclud-
ing a licensing agreement, in order to communicate to the public or make available to the public 
works or other subject matter.’ 
‘4. If no authorisation is granted, online content-sharing service providers shall be liable for 
unauthorised acts of communication to the public, including making available to the public, of 
copyright-protected works and other subject matter.’ 
‘8. The application of this Article shall not lead to any general monitoring obligation.’ 
 
According to the article, online content-sharing service providers will still be liable for publica-
tion of copyright-protected works but the article does not require service providers to prevent 
unauthorised uploads of copyright-protected works. This is highlighted in the paragraph eight 
with the mention of service providers not being obliged to perform general monitoring which is 
what the fears of the critics of the directive were directed to.  
 
In addition to these, a parody exception, Article 17(7), was added, presumably because of the 
fears surrounding the status of parodies and memes even though parody was already allowed in 
the InfoSoc Directive: 
 
 ‘Member States shall ensure that users in each Member State are able to rely on any of the 
following existing exceptions or limitations when uploading and making available content gen-
erated by users on online content-sharing services: …(b) use for the purpose of caricature, par-
ody or pastiche.’ 
 
This can be seen to further strengthen the status of parodies because the exception means that 
users’ rights to use copyrighted material for the purpose of parodies shall be ensured. Perhaps 
one way of ensuring this could be that the Member States obligate online content-sharing ser-
vices to set up systems that enable uploads of parodies. It can be argued that automatic filters 
that filter all unauthorised copyrighted material and do not discriminate between legal and non-
legal uploads of this kind of material could be seen to go against the parody exception provision. 
Because of the expression ‘Member States shall ensure’ is relatively strong, it could be that a 
subsequent appeal system does not ensure well enough users’ rights to upload parodies. 
31 
 
3.4 Case law regarding parody and copyright (Deckmyn) 
 
3.4.1 General information 
 
The ECJ preliminary ruling Deckmyn is a very significant decision in the EU law on the field of 
parody and copyright. As mentioned before, it established that parody is an autonomous concept 
in the EU law and provided a uniform definition for parody in the EU law. In the InfoSoc Di-
rective there is no definition for parody, thus Deckmyn provided clarity and uniformity in the 
EU law regarding parody. In this subchapter Deckmyn will be discussed in detail because of its 
major significance on the field of parody and copyright in the EU law.  
 
Before the analysis, it would be useful to explain what a preliminary ruling is in the EU law. A 
preliminary ruling is an ECJ decision requested by a national court which is considering a case 
in which a question of interpretation of EU law has raised. This request will be given an answer 
in the form of a preliminary ruling ‘when a question of interpretation is new and of general 
interest for the uniform application of EU law, or where the existing case-law does not appear 
to give the necessary guidance to deal with a new legal situation.’92  
 
Deckmyn considered the interpretation of Article 5(3) of the InfoSoc Directive. This request 
was made by the hof van beroep te Brussel (Court of Appeal, Brussels) ‘in proceedings between 
Mr Deckmyn and the Vrijheidsfonds VZW, a non-profit association, and various heirs of Mr 
Vandersteen, author of the Suske en Wiske comic books (known in English as Spike and Suzy, 
and in French as Bob and Bobette) and the holders of the rights associated with those works 
(‘Vandersteen and Others’)’ as well about the distribution by Mr. Deckmyn of a calendar which 
involved a drawing (the drawing at issue93) looking similar to a drawing which had been on the 
cover of one of the books in the Suske en Wiske series.94 
 
 
                                                 
92 [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:l14552] (10.11.2019). 
93 The term used by the ECJ in Deckmyn. 
94 C-201/13 Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds (2014), paras 1-2. 
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3.4.2 Legal background 
 
The ECJ states that the provisions in the EU law relevant for the ruling are the following ones 
found in the InfoSoc Directive: 
 
Recital 3: 
 
‘The proposed harmonisation will help to implement the four freedoms of the internal market 
and relates to compliance with the fundamental principles of law and especially of property, 
including intellectual property, and freedom of expression and the public interest.’ 
 
Recital 31: 
 
‘A fair balance of rights and interests between the different categories of rightholders, as well as 
between the different categories of rightholders and users of protected subject-matter must be 
safeguarded…’ 
 
Article 5(3): 
 
‘Member States may provide for exceptions or limitations to the rights provided for in Articles 
2 and 3[, entitled respectively “Reproduction right” and “Right of communication to the public 
of works and right of making available to the public other subject-matter”,] in the following 
cases: 
- (k) use for the purpose of caricature, parody or pastiche’95 
 
The first mentioned Recital 3 means that the proposed harmonisation in the Directive relates to 
adherence to the right to property, including intellectual property, and the freedom of expres-
sion. Thus, it is seen in the Recital that both fundamental principles of law are to be complied 
with. What is essential in Recital 31 what comes to parody and copyright is the fact there must 
a fair balance between rightholders (copyright holders) and users of protected subject-matter 
                                                 
95 C-201/13 Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds (2014), paras 3-5. 
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(which can be seen to mean also parodists).  Thus, both sides, copyright holders’ right and par-
odists’ right to parody, must be taken into account. 
  
The lastly mentioned parody exception, which has been discussed before, means that if a Mem-
ber State has provided a parody exception, a person can reproduce a copyright-protected work 
for the purpose of making a parody and communicate that work for the public or make it avail-
able to public. 
 
In the Belgian copyright law [Article 22(1) of the Law of 30 June 1994 on copyright and related 
rights (Belgisch Staatsblad of 27 July 1994, p. 19297, Belgian Copyright Act)] is found the 
following relevant provision:  
 
‘Once a work has been lawfully published, its author may not prohibit: - 
6. caricature, parody and pastiche, observing fair practice’96 
 
Thus, in the Belgian law there is an express parody exception. Next the dispute will be discussed 
in detail. 
 
3.4.3 Course of events 
 
Mr. Deckmyn is a member of Vlaams Belang political party97 while the purpose of the 
Vrijheidsfonds is the financial and material aid of the party. At the reception that was held on 9 
January 2011 by the City of Ghent in Belgium for the celebration of the New Year, Mr. 
Deckmyn distributed calendars in which he was marked as the editor. The cover page of the 
calendars included the drawing at issue. 
 
The drawing at issue looked similar to the one which was on the cover of the Suske en Wiske 
comic book entitled ‘De Wilde Weldoener’ (which can be approximately translated as ‘The 
Compulsive Benefactor’), which was finished in 1961 by Mr Vandersteen. In that drawing is 
                                                 
96 C-201/13 Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds (2014), para 6. 
97 At least he was at the time of the ruling. 
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seen one of the comic book’s main characters who is wearing a white tunic and throwing coins 
to people who are attempting to collect them. In the drawing at issue98 the character was substi-
tuted with people who were wearing veils and people of colour. 
 
Vandersteen and Others were of the opinion that the drawing at issue and its communication to 
the public amounted to a violation of their respective copyrights and therefore took legal action 
against Mr Deckmyn and the Vrijheidsfonds before the rechtbank van eerste aanleg te Brussel 
(Court of First Instance, Brussels) which decided that the defendants must stop the use of the 
drawing and if they will not do that they are required to pay a periodical penalty. 
 
Before the referring court heard the appeal against the decision given at Court of First Instance, 
Mr Deckmyn and the Vrijheidsfonds stated, especially, that the drawing at issue is considered a 
political cartoon which is within the scope of parody regulated in the Belgian Copyright Act. 
 
Vandersteen and Others disagreed with this interpretation and in their view, parody had to meet 
certain criteria which were not met in this case: ‘to fulfil a critical purpose; itself show original-
ity; display humorous traits; seek to ridicule the original work; and not borrow a greater number 
of formal elements from the original work than is strictly necessary in order to produce the 
parody.’ They also argued that the drawing at issue expressed a discriminatory message because 
of the fact that the characters who were collecting coins in the original drawing, were substituted 
in the drawing at issue by people who were wearing veils and people of colour.99 
 
3.4.4 Questions asked from the ECJ 
 
In the aforementioned situation, the hof van beroep te Brussel (Court of Appeal, Brussels) chose 
to stay the proceedings and to refer these questions to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling: 
 
 ‘1. Is the concept of “parody” an autonomous concept of EU law? 
 
                                                 
98 View the original drawing and the drawing at issue: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deckmyn_v_Vandersteen]. 
99 C-201/13 Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds (2014), paras 7-12. 
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2. If so, must a parody satisfy the following conditions or conform to the following characteris-
tics: 
- display an original character of its own (originality); 
- display that character in such a manner that the parody cannot reasonably be ascribed to the 
author of the original work; 
- seek to be humorous or to mock, regardless of whether any criticism thereby expressed ap-
plies to the original work or to something or someone else; 
- mention the source of the parodied work? 
 
3. Must a work satisfy any other conditions or conform to other characteristics in order to be 
capable of being labelled as a parody?’100 
 
The questions 2 and 3 narrow down to what is meant by parody in the EU law. 
 
To the first question the ECJ answered affirmatively: parody is an autonomous concept in the 
EU law. It justified this decision by first stating the Court has in a consistent manner been of the 
opinion that it stems from 
 
‘the need for uniform application of EU law and from the principle of equality that the terms of 
a provision of EU law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for 
the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and 
uniform interpretation throughout the European Union, having regard to the context of the pro-
vision and the objective pursued by the legislation in question…’101 
 
From this can be seen the conditions when an autonomous and uniform interpretation for a 
term/terms is needed in the whole of the EU; this is a case if a provision of the EU law does not 
refer directly to national laws for them to decide on its meaning and scope. One must however 
take into account the context of the provision and the objective of the legislation under consid-
eration which makes the Court’s opinion somewhat vaguer as it is no clear how the context of 
the provision or the objective are to be taken into account exactly. This last sentence could have 
                                                 
100 C-201/13 Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds (2014), para 13. 
101 C-201/13 Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds (2014), para 14. 
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been given to ensure that legislation of which purpose has been to enable the Member States the 
right to define a term can do this even if for some reason an express reference to the law of the 
Member States had been left out. 
 
The ECJ suggested also that, based on the EU case law102, the concept of ‘parody’ which is 
mentioned in a provision of the InfoSoc Directive which does not refer to national laws, has to 
be considered as an autonomous concept of EU law and given a uniform interpretation in the 
whole of the EU.103 Article 5(k), the parody exception, indeed does not refer to national laws 
and thus the ECJ concludes it an autonomous concept of EU law and one that has to be given a 
uniform interpretation.  
 
The ECJ states that this interpretation of parody being an autonomous concept of EU law and 
needing a uniform interpretation is not undone even though Article 5(3) is of its nature volun-
tary. The ECJ claims that if the Member States that have implemented the exception could de-
cide themselves the limits in an unharmonized fashion, varying from a Member State to another, 
this would be in opposition to the objective of the directive. 
 
For the justification for this claim the ECJ offers two earlier judgements considering the InfoSoc 
Directive; Padawan104 and ACI Adam and Others105.106 In both cases the ECJ stated that an 
interpretation according to which the Member States which have introduced the private copying 
exception, 
 
“provided for by EU law and including, as set out in recitals 35 and 38 in the preamble to that 
directive, the concept of ‘fair compensation’ as an essential element, are free to determine the 
limits in an inconsistent and unharmonised manner which may vary from one Member State to 
                                                 
102 Such as a ’judgment in Padawan, C-467/08, EU:C:2010:620, paragraph 32’ [C-201/13 Deckmyn and 
Vrijheidsfonds (2014), para 14]. 
103 C-201/13 Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds (2014), para 15. 
104 C-467/08 Padawan (2010). 
105 C-435/12 ACI Adam and Others (2014). 
106 C-201/13 Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds (2014), para 16. 
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another, would be incompatible with the objective of that directive of harmonising certain as-
pects of the Law on copyright and related rights in the information society.”107 
 
Thus, it can be seen from the ECJs earlier case law that the ECJ has already earlier taken stance 
that in the case of voluntary introduction of an exception in the InfoSoc Directive, if there is an 
undefined term related to that, its limits should not be left for the Member States to decide. It is 
logical and from the perspective of legal certainty right for the ECJ to apply the same interpre-
tation in this case as well.  
 
Regarding the second and third question, the ECJ states that for the reason that the InfoSoc 
Directive does not provide a definition for the concept of parody, the meaning and scope of the 
term has to be, as the ECJ has consistently noted, decided by regarding its usual meaning in 
everyday language, while at the same taking into consideration the context in which it appears 
and ‘the purposes of the rules of which it is part’. 
 
The ECJ then argues that taking into account ‘the usual meaning of the term ‘parody’ in every-
day language’, it is not challenged, as the Advocate General regarded in his Opinion108 that the 
crucial elements of parody are ‘first, to evoke an existing work while being noticeably different 
from it, and, secondly, to constitute an expression of humour or mockery.’109 
 
As was touched upon earlier, one could criticise the definition for its lack of clarity. As one of 
its conditions is humour [and if one assumes this refers to having a humorous effect (intent is 
another possibility)], one has to conclude that it is simply impossible to regulate what constitutes 
humour in detail; there are so many types of humour that any definition would need to be very 
wide and it would not probably bring anymore clarity compared to the situation of not having 
the definition at all. Defining humour, in any case, would be too complex a task. As the defini-
tion is not desirable, who is, then, to decide whether a parody is funny or not. There is probably 
no piece of creative work (or any other existing thing) that all people find funny. Determining 
                                                 
107 C-467/08 Padawan (2010), para 36; C-435/12 ACI Adam and Others (2014), para 49. 
108 Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón - 22 May 2014 - Case C-201/13, point 48. 
109 C-201/13 Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds (2014), paras 19-20. 
38 
 
the existence of humour can be a highly demanding task in some cases. In some cases, the task 
will be easier; for example, in the case of physical humour accompanied with certain kind of 
music. A difficult field of humour could be, for instance, black humour in which humour is 
found in making fun of shocking or disturbing issues. At face value or to some persons, parody 
embodying black humour could look as if there is no humour in it but if presented to a person 
who finds black humour funny, the judgement could be different. If the humour condition means 
parody needs to have a humorous effect, national courts who are making these decisions whether 
a parody is funny or not, could in hard cases perhaps consult researchers of arts or comparative 
literature, as was suggested earlier. This would bring a needed objectivity110 to the determination 
of the existence of humour in a parody.  
 
However, as Rosati has noted on the condition of humour or mockery, there was no explanation 
whether a parody has to contain a humorous intent or in addition to that create a humorous 
effect. If the condition was ‘intent’ (as according to Rosati seems to be case under US law), then 
the parody exception would be wider in scope than if there was a requirement for a humorous 
effect. After all, only requiring intent would be more in in line with the freedom of expression. 
Rosati further remarks that in regard to Article 10 of the ECHR the European Court of Human 
Rights has stated consistently that everyone is guaranteed the freedom of expression, and even 
the purpose of the expression, for instance whether the expression is done for profit or not, has 
no relevance in deciding whether protection should be provided under Article 10. Thus, Rosati 
regards that it would be overly restrictive if merely people who were funny had a right to parody 
as a part of the freedom of expression and those who fail to achieve a humorous effect would 
not be protected under Article 10. 
 
If the condition was ‘effect’, Rosati argues that it is not clear who would decide when this re-
quirement is fulfilled. Would it be the judge? Or would the humour be evaluated ‘according to 
the standards of that particular Member State’? If this was the case, then there could exist paro-
dies permitted under the laws of some Member States and forbidden in others. This would 
                                                 
110 Although one could argue that their opinion is not completely objective either but arguably more objective when 
taking into account their knowledge. 
39 
 
constitute an unfavourable effect on the free movement of goods and services and, fundamen-
tally, the aimed harmonisation of the parody exception. 
 
Rosati suggests that one more option might be that a humorous effect is evaluated by reflecting 
it to the standards of the ‘society’ (perhaps European/EU society) which the Advocate General 
referred to in his opinion. However, if this was the approach taken, there could be cases in which 
parodies that are country- or sector- specific could be seen not to achieve a humorous effect by 
the European/EU society. In this case, Rosati sees that the trade mark law concept of ‘average 
consumer’ could be brought into copyright law.  
 
Finally, Rosati states that the problems associated with the requirement of a humorous effect 
and as a humorous intent best complies with Article 10 lead to the conclusion that the condition 
of humour refers to a humorous intent.111 
 
I agree with Rosati’s arguments here. If the condition was a humorous intent, this would be 
much more in line with the freedom of expression. This removes also the need for evaluation 
whether a work is funny or not, as was discussed earlier would be very difficult, and these eval-
uations can be seen to be prone to subjectivity. If the condition was a humorous effect, this could 
be seen to decrease the number of parodies made in the fear of it not being deemed funny or 
would perhaps lead to several parodies of which intent was humour judged as failing to achieve 
a humorous effect and thus unlawful. This could then also reduce the variety of different paro-
dies as arguably less parodies containing more subtle humour would be made as these would 
impose a greater risk being judged as non-humorous. The European/EU society perspective 
could lead to, as Rosati suggests, to prohibition of parodies of which humour is country-specific; 
arguably in the EU and Europe exists country-specific humour as humour is not likely to be 
uniform in Europe/the EU. Determining the conditions for what constitutes standards of Euro-
pean humour would be a very difficult and demanding task also. The employed standards would 
likely lead to the decrease in parodies made and the reduction in the variety of different parodies. 
Furthermore, the number of unlawful parodies could increase.  
                                                 
111 Rosati 2015, pp. 6-7. 
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The potential effects of the condition of humour being a humorous effect (whichever way this 
would be implemented) would not be a welcome development from the perspective of freedom 
of expression. Thus, from the viewpoint of practicality and freedom of expression the best in-
terpretation would be the humorous intent. 
 
However, if having a humorous intent is enough, then how would this would be demonstrated? 
Is it enough that a creator of a parody says so or is there need for an additional proof? There 
could also be a case where a creator of a work has not had a humorous intent but because of a 
copyright infringement claim refers to having had one. This could be problematic from the per-
spective of copyright holders.  
 
The question of whether a humorous intent or effect is better is a difficult one. One can, how-
ever, argue that the large difficulties in implementation and the great restriction on the freedom 
of expression outweigh the potential damages of the condition of a humorous intent on copyright 
holders; the freedom of expression can be argued in the case of a humorous effect being the 
condition be more restricted than what copyright holders the right to property would be if the 
condition was a humorous intent and thus the right balance between the rights that the ECJ 
demands would not be met. Thus, it can be argued that an interpretation of the condition being 
one of a humorous intent would be fairer and preferable taking into account the right balance 
between the rights. 
 
Considering the conditions presented by the referring court, the ECJ regards that it is not evident 
either from the ordinary meaning of the term ‘parody’ in everyday language or from the choice 
of words of Article 5(3)(k) of the InfoSoc Directive, that the concept of parody would contain 
the conditions that were presented by the referring court in its second question, that is:  
 
‘that the parody should display an original character of its own, other than that of displaying 
noticeable differences with respect to the original parodied work; could reasonably be attributed 
to a person other than the author of the original work itself; should relate to the original work 
itself or mention the source of the parodied work.’112 
                                                 
112 C-201/13 Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds (2014), para 21. 
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Let us re-examine the definition of parody by Oxford English Dictionary presented in Chapter 
2:  
 
“a literary composition modelled on and imitating another work, esp. a composition in which 
the characteristic style and themes of a particular author or genre are satirized by being applied 
to inappropriate or unlikely subjects or are otherwise exaggerated for comic effect.’ 
 
The OED has established itself as ‘the accepted authority on the English language’113, thus it 
can be argued that from its definitions can be seen ordinary meanings of words in English lan-
guage. In the definition is not seen the conditions presented by the referring court, thus they are 
not part of the common meaning in English language. The Advocate General also used the OED 
as his source for the English definition and also provided the definition of parody in German, 
Dutch and Spanish and, as was earlier indirectly mentioned, came to the same conclusion that 
the common meaning of parody contains does not contain the conditions presented by the refer-
ring court.114 
 
The ECJ argues that the interpretation of the concept of parody not containing the conditions 
presented by the referring court is not challenged when taking into account the context of Article 
5(3)(k) which sets out an exception to the rights given in Articles 2 and 3 and ‘must, therefore, 
be interpreted strictly’. What the ECJ means by this strict interpretation is that the interpretation 
of the concept of parody has to permit the effectiveness of the exception and in that way be 
protected and its purpose observed.115 
 
 
What the ECJ seems to mean is that if we were to put too many conditions on the concept of 
parody, it would essentially render the exception in the Infosoc Directive useless. The exception 
would thus not be able to achieve the purpose why it was created, namely: to act as an effective 
exception to the rights in Article 2 and 3. Thus, to secure its effectiveness, not too many condi-
tions should be put on the concept of parody. 
                                                 
113 [https://languages.oup.com/oed] (23.10.2019) 
114 Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón - 22 May 2014 - Case C-201/13, point 47. 
115 C-201/13 Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds (2014), paras 22-23. 
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Jongsma regards that it can be argued that as the Member States are permitted not to have an 
exception for parody, they also have a right to set an exception that has a more limited scope 
than what the parody exception in the directive has. Another issue is whether the ECJ agrees 
with this. This is a particularly relevant issue to the Member States, such as Belgium, France, 
the Netherlands, that have additional conditions for parody. Strictly speaking, the ECJ merely 
took the view that the concept of parody itself should be interpreted uniformly. However, the 
usefulness of a uniform interpretation could be cast into doubt if this interpretation would be 
possible to undermine by permitting the Member States to use additional conditions for parody 
that were rejected in the ECJ’s definition. In addition to that this would also subvert the operat-
ing of the internal market which is a crucial idea in the Infosoc Directive. Jongsma also notes 
that in DR and TV2 Danmark (TV2 Danmark) case which considered the interpretation of Arti-
cle 5(2)(d) of the InfoSoc Directive, the ECJ expressly rejected the notion that the Member 
States have a right to narrow the scope of the exceptions that have been harmonised116.117 
 
Thus, Jongsma argues that the Member States are probably not permitted to change the scope 
of the exceptions (including parody) found in the Infosoc Directive by adding extra conditions 
for them. In the case of parodies, however, it is uncertain how much change is needed to do for 
the existing additional conditions in the national laws.118 
 
This seems to be a correct interpretation. If new additional conditions were permitted to be set, 
as Jongsma argues, it would weaken the effect of the ECJ’s definition. If the uniformity has 
been the goal in defining the parody, it is logical that the Member States are not allowed to 
impose new conditions on the top of the ECJ’s definition. One can also look at the issue directly 
from the perspective of Deckmyn. If after the ECJ’s preliminary ruling and in it having set out 
the conditions for parody in the EU law, the Belgian court could decide to impose additional 
conditions for the parody, the effect of this decision on this particular case in the Belgian court 
would be weakened. Taking into account TV2 Danmark, the interpretation can be argued to be 
correct. What comes to the permissibility of the additional parody conditions that already existed 
                                                 
116 C-510/10 DR and TV2 Danmark (2012), para 36. 
117 Jongsma IIC - International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 2017, pp. 670-671. 
118 Jongsma IIC - International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 2017, p. 671. 
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in national laws before Deckmyn, the issue is difficult. From the perspective of uniformity, 
which was the goal in providing the definition, it would be logical that the additional parody 
conditions that already existed before Deckmyn would have also become non-applicable be-
cause of the ECJ’s decision.  
 
Rosati argues that in regard to these different additional conditions that existed before Deckmyn 
in national laws, it is unlikely that it would be possible, for example, for France to require that 
parodies must observe the rules of the genre.119 Thus, she seems to suggest that applying these 
conditions is not allowed for any Member State after Deckmyn. This could well be so but how 
the issue actually is remains to be seen. 
 
Next, the ECJ recalls the objectives of the directive from recital 3 in the preamble to the Di-
rective, in which it was mentioned, inter alia, that the freedom of expression is to be complied 
with. The ECJ, then states that it is not questioned that parody is a suitable method to express 
an opinion.  
 
Furthermore, the ECJ mentions that in recital 31 in the preamble to the Directive, the exceptions 
to the rights established in Articles 2 and 3 of the Directive, aim to attain a ‘fair balance’ be-
tween, especially, the rights of the authors and the rights of users of copyright-protected works. 
Thus, it stems from that that, in a particular case, the application of the exception for parody, 
has to find a fair balance between the rights of the copyright holders of an original work and the 
freedom of expression of the user of that original work who is depending on the exception for 
parody. 
 
The ECJ states that in order to decide whether, in a particular case, the application of the excep-
tion for parody maintains the fair balance, all the circumstances of the case have to be consid-
ered.  The ECJ further states that one should take into account the opinion of Vandersteen and 
Others; they are of the opinion that because the characters who were collecting coins in the 
original drawing were substituted in the drawing at issue by people who were wearing veils and 
                                                 
119 Rosati 2015, p. 6. 
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people of colour, the drawing presents a discriminatory message which has the consequence of 
linking the original work with such a message. If that is the situation, which the ECJ reminds is 
for the national court to evaluate, one should pay attention to:  
 
‘the principle of non-discrimination based on race, colour and ethnic origin, as was specifically 
defined in Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal 
treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (OJ 2000 L 180, p. 22)120, and 
confirmed, inter alia, by Article 21(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union121’122 
 
The ECJ notes that in situations where a discriminatory message is presented in parody, the 
holders of rights supplied in Articles 2 and 3, such as Vandersteen and Others, have, in general, 
a valid reason for making sure that a copyright-protected work is not linked with such a mes-
sage.123 
 
Thus, it can be drawn from this that even if a parody fulfils the conditions for the parody excep-
tion in the EU copyright law, it is not protected if it conveys a discriminatory message or its 
nature is discriminatory which is against ‘the principle of equal treatment between persons irre-
spective of racial or ethnic origin’ in the Race Equality Directive and the CFR.  
 
However, this consideration of right holders having a reason to make sure their work is not 
linked with a discriminatory message has been under a lot of critical discussion. For example it 
has been noted that the ECJ does not determine exactly what comprises a discriminatory mes-
sage to which right holders have a reason to oppose to, that discrimination is ‘a diffuse concept’ 
and of which application may result in the banning of every critical and humorous parody if its 
proper meaning is misunderstood, that permitting right holders to oppose to undesirable associ-
ations of their works might limit largely the scope of the parody exception, that copyright is not 
                                                 
120 (The Race Equality Directive) Article 2(1): ‘For the purposes of this Directive, the principle of equal treatment 
shall mean that there shall be no direct or indirect discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin.’ 
121 ‘Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, 
language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, 
disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.’ 
122 C-201/13 Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds (2014), paras 25-30. 
123 C-201/13 Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds (2014), para 31. 
45 
 
the most well suited method to tackle xenophobic and discriminatory expressions and that pro-
tection against undesired associations belongs traditionally more to the field of moral rights, 
which is an area of law that is unharmonized. Furthermore, it has been noted that it is crucial to 
notice that a parody will not always be attributed to ‘the author of the work on which it is based’, 
which raises the question whether there actually exists a valid interest for right holders to oppose 
to such discriminatory messages.124  
 
These are valid concerns. For example, I agree that as discrimination is a vague concept and not 
defined by the ECJ, applying it to parodies might well cause many parodies that do not aim to 
discriminate to be deemed discriminatory because they were understood incorrectly. This 
vagueness is a similar problem which is found with the earlier discussed humour condition. As 
one is dealing with an important exception which relates to the freedom of expression, it is 
problematic if it can be limited with vague norms which can cause the exception to lose its 
effectiveness. The effectiveness of the parody exception was, after all, something that the ECJ 
deemed important. However, if one were to take the evaluation of discrimination to parody cases 
in the EU law as the ECJ suggests, evaluating whether a parody has had a discriminatory effect 
would be again problematic for the same reasons as it would be with whether parody has had a 
humorous effect. Thus, the same interpretation of intent as was suggested earlier with the hu-
mour condition could be taken here; if the intent of a parody has been discriminatory, it would 
not be considered lawful and in turn, if it has not been discriminatory, it would be lawful. 
 
The ECJ states that it is the responsibility of the national court to decide, taking into account all 
of the circumstances of the case, whether the application of the exception for parody, on the 
presumption that the drawing at issue fulfils the crucial conditions, maintains the fair balance.125 
Thus, the ECJ did not decide, among other mentioned things, whether the parody in this case 
fulfils the conditions for the parody exception. This was left for the national court to decide as 
well, which is in accordance with the division of the responsibilities between the ECJ and na-
tional courts. The ECJ is responsible to give an answer to the interpretation of EU law if a 
national court requests this, but a national court must make the actual decisions so to say. 
                                                 
124 Jongsma IIC - International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 2017, p. 666. 
125 C-201/13 Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds (2014), para 32. 
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Thus, the definition for parody was provided in the answers to the second and third questions. 
The ECJ’s answer to the second and third questions can be summarised to: The parody exception 
has two conditions in the EU copyright law of which a parody has to fulfil: evoking of ‘an 
existing work while being noticeably different from it’, and, constituting ‘an expression of hu-
mour or mockery’. It does not have other conditions. However, a fair balance must be attained 
between the copyright holders’ rights and the rights of those who use original works for parody 
purposes. 
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4. PARODY AND COPYRIGHT IN NATIONAL LAWS 
 
4.1 EU Member States 
 
In this subchapter will be examined how the relationship between parody and copyright is reg-
ulated in a few EU Member States’ law; Finland, France, the Netherlands and the United King-
dom. As all these countries are EU Member States and there is EU law regulating the relation-
ship between parody and copyright, there are no major differences as to this regulation of parody 
and copyright between the EU law and national laws, but an overview will be given of the 
regulation in these national laws to show a reader some examples of states which have set out a 
parody exception and one that has not. Furthermore, an overview will be given of conditions for 
the parody exceptions found in national laws that are not found in the ECJ’s definition. One 
must note, however, the earlier discussion in this paper about the uncertain status of the addi-
tional parody conditions that already existed in national laws before Deckmyn (France and the 
Netherlands) and ones that came into force after Deckmyn (the United Kingdom). One must not 
assume that these additional conditions are still valid even though they are presented here. The 
conditions will be shown to demonstrate that national laws do not necessarily reflect the ECJ’s 
definition yet. 
 
4.1.1 Finland 
 
In the Finnish Copyright Act (FCA) there is not an express exception for parody. The same 
applies to pastiche and caricature. However, in the legal academia parody has been traditionally 
viewed as a part of conversion done in free association [the FCA section (§) 4.2] and in some 
cases could be considered to under a quotation right (22 §).126 The FCA 4.2 § and 22 § state 
respectively: 
 
‘If a person, in free association with a work, has created a new and independent work, his 
copyright shall not be subject to the right in the original work.’ (4.2 §) 
                                                 
126 Alén-Savikko 2017, p. 204. 
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‘A work made public may be quoted, in accordance with proper usage to the extent necessary 
for the purpose.’ (22 §) 
 
According to Alén-Savikko parody can be considered as a part of conversion done in free asso-
ciation (4.2 §) because it uses the original work for an unfamiliar purpose. However, it must 
transcend the threshold of work which means it has to fulfil certain conditions to enjoy the 
protection under the FCA.127 These conditions are that a work must be 1) independent and 2) 
original. These conditions are essentially the same as the conditions in the FCA 4.2 §.128 Thus, 
the conditions for parody in the Finnish law, if evaluated from the perspective of conversion 
done in free association, are that it has to be independent and original or new. According to 
Harenko and Tarkela the transcendence of the threshold of work is evaluated on a case-by-case 
basis at the courts but for different types of work there are established interpretations consider-
ing which kinds of works are protected under the law.129 
 
The Finnish Copyright Council, which is established by the Copyright Act and the Copyright 
Decree, gives statements, when requested, on how to apply the Copyright Act and also gives 
assistance to the Ministry of Education and Culture in the processing of matters that are con-
nected with copyright. Its statements are recommendations and non-binding130, but they have 
had a guiding effect on to the interpretation of the Copyright Act.131 Its statements are also 
discussed in legal research.132  
 
The FCC has given statements regarding parodies as well. One of these statements133 (TN 
2010:3) was requested to be given to questions relating to a Helsinki Court of Appeal case (HO 
15.5.2011 no. 1157) [Pelastakaa pedofiilit (Save the Paedophiles) case] in which the defendant 
B had been accused of creating a website very similar to the website of the organisation called 
                                                 
127 Alén-Savikko 2017, p. 207. 
128 It can be argued that ‘new’ refers to ‘original’ in the FCA 4.2 § even though the usual meaning of new is not the 
same as original. 
129 Harenko – Tarkela 2017, p. 18. 
130 [https://minedu.fi/en/copyright-council] (21.09.2019)  
131 Harenko – Tarkela 2017, p. 574. 
132 See for example Alen-Savikko 2017. 
133 Others include, for example, TN 2017:4 which considered copyright and parody of paintings. 
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Pelastakaa lapset ry (Save the Children) and using on it parts of the texts from the Pelastakaa 
lapset website. The logo on the ‘parody website’ had also been accused of being of a kind which 
could be mistaken for the logo of Pelastakaa lapset ry. The requester of the statement, the pros-
ecutor of the jurisdictional district, had requested answers for the following questions: 1) Was 
the C’s (the creator of the Pelastakaa lapset website) work considered to transcend the threshold 
of work and 2) if so, did B’s website infringe on the C’s moral rights (especially there was an 
interest to know whether the B’s website was considered to be a parody) or the usage/financial 
rights of Pelastakaa lapset ry that C had given to it.134 
 
The FCC concluded that the logo and parts of the text on the Pelastakaa lapset website trans-
cended the threshold of work. What came to the parody website, the FCC assessed that the logo 
appearing on it, even though somewhat similar to the logo of Pelastakaa lapset ry, transcended 
the threshold of work; it was considered to be a conversion done in free association. Considering 
the texts appearing on the parody website, they were almost word-to-word copied from the Pe-
lastakaa lapset website. However, according to the FCC even extensive word-to-word usage 
could be justified for parody purposes when a new and independent work is considered to have 
been created. The FCC argued that in this case the Pelastakaa pedofiilit website was considered 
to be a parody. However, because the text on the parody website consisted almost completely 
of a text that is protected under Copyright Act 1 § and the changing of the word ‘lapset’ (chil-
dren) to ‘pedofiilit’ (paedophiles) did not represent independent and original work, it was not 
thus an independent and original work. The website’s usage of the text was not considered to 
fall under 22 § either which considers the quotation right. Furthermore, the FCC considered the 
parody website to infringe on the moral rights of C. 135 The Helsinki Court of Appeal agreed 
with the statement of the FCC and gave a judgement accordingly.136 
 
What is notable in this case, that the FCC (and the Helsinki Court of Appeal agreed with this) 
concluded that even a wide word-to-word usage in parodies could be justified in the Finnish 
law. However, the work still needs to be considered independent and original. The wide word-
                                                 
134 TN 2010:3, pp. 1-2. 
135 TN 2010:3, pp. 6-9. 
136 Alén-Savikko 2017, p. 225. 
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to-word usage could be considered to give a considerable amount of leeway to a parodist as to 
how much they can reproduce the original textual material. In this case, however, there were 
simply too few original elements on the website in order for it to be considered original and thus 
it failed to meet the originality condition.  
 
4.1.2 France 
 
In the French legislation, there is an express exception for parody, which existed before 
Deckmyn. The exception is supported by the freedom of expression.137 According to Article L 
122-5 of the French Intellectual Property Code: 
 
‘Once a work has been disclosed, the author may not prohibit: 
- 4°. parody, pastiche and caricature, observing the rules of the genre.’ 
 
As one can see parody, pastiche and caricature are again mentioned in the same context with 
parody. In order for the parodying work to be included under the parody exception, it has to 
fulfil certain conditions. First of these is that the goal in transforming the original work must be 
humour; to cause people to laugh. Secondly, the parodying work must not cause harm to the 
author of the original work. It should not harm either their moral or commercial rights. However, 
the commercialisation of the parody itself is not forbidden which has been demonstrated in the 
French case law. Thirdly, the transformative work must contain a considerable modification to 
the original work.138 
 
4.1.3 Netherlands 
 
There is an express exception for parody in the Dutch Copyright Act (Article 18b), which ex-
isted before Deckmyn, and states as follows:  
 
‘Not regarded as an infringement of the copyright in a literary, scientific or artistic 
                                                 
137 Mendis and Kretschmer 2013, p. 18. 
138 Mendis and Kretschmer 2013, pp. 18-19 and 21. 
51 
 
work, is the making public or reproduction of it in the context of a caricature, 
parody or pastiche, provided the use is in accordance with what social custom 
regards as reasonably acceptable.’139 
 
Here again the caricature and pastiche are mentioned in the same context as parody. Notable is 
the last clause regulating the fact that the use must be in accordance with what social custom 
regards as reasonably acceptable. This can be considered to have given a leeway to the courts 
in the past on deciding what constitutes social custom regarding the issue (as the situation is at 
the moment uncertain as to the applicability of the additional conditions of parody in national 
laws). After the provision was introduced, the Dutch courts have demonstrated larger readiness 
to invoke freedom of speech in parody cases, such as the Darfurnica and Miffy cases.140  
 
Next the Miffy case (2011)141 will be discussed. One must note that the case is essentially about 
moral rights of copyright (and trademark rights). Moral rights are part of an area of copyright 
law which has not been harmonised in the EU law but the case will be shown as a demonstration 
of the importance that the Dutch courts have put on the freedom of expression as opposed to 
copyright. The Miffy case142 concerned punt.nl, one of the largest hosting providers in the Neth-
erlands, and Miffy (Nijntje in Dutch), the rabbit character in picture books created by Dick 
Bruna.143144 On the website www.gratisanimaties.punt.nl and www.terreurmutsie.punt.nl were 
published seven cartoons that portrayed Miffy in unexpected conditions. There was, for in-
stance, a cartoon which showed Miffy with big red eyes and sniffing cocaine (‘lijntje’145) and 
another one in which Miffy was ‘in an airplane about to crash into a skyscraper’ (nijn-eleven’). 
Other ones included sexual themes.146 
 
                                                 
139 Eechoud: Copyright Act – Auteurswet - Unofficial translation. 
140 Lee CREATe Working Paper 2015, p. 115. 
141 Court of Appeal of Amsterdam, decision of 13 September 2011, LJN: BS7825, (Mercis B.V. / Punt.nl B.V.) 
overturning District Court of Amsterdam, 22 December 2009 LJN: BK7383 (Mercis B.V. / Punt.nl B.V.). 
142 No English translation was found about the Miffy case; thus, the decision to base the information on it on the 
Guibault’s article. 
143 Guibault JIPITEC 2011, p. 237. 
144 [https://www.miffy.com/about-miffy] (25.09.2019). 
145 Meaning a line in English [https://www.linguee.com/dutch-english/translation/lijntje.html] (25.09.2019). 
146 Guibault JIPITEC 2011, pp. 237-238. 
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The copyright holders Mercis and Bruna opposed to the cartoons based on copyright and trade-
mark rights. Punt.nl used the aforementioned parody exception as the justification for the pub-
lication of the cartoons.147 
 
The Court of Appeal of Amsterdam decided that all seven parodies on the websites hosted by 
Punt.nl did not infringe on copyrights of Mercis and Bruna. The Court of Appeal stated that 
parodies of Milly connected with sex, drugs and terrorism are not ‘necessarily illegal’. The Court 
of Appeal also created a central principle: all cartoons undeniably have a humoristic and ironis-
ing nature, although not everyone will find them funny. Therefore, the seven parodies could not 
be forbidden on the basis of copyright law or trademark law.148 
 
The case can be seen to be a significant decision in favour of parody (and the freedom of ex-
pression) as opposed to copyright. The themes that were connected with Miffy in the seven 
parodies, could be seen as offending to the copyrights of Mercis and Bruna. The severity, for 
example, of the association of drugs and terrorism with a child book character, while taking into 
account the great contrast between the child book themes and the innocence associated with 
child books and the themes used in the parodies, could be seen to offend significantly the moral 
rights of the copyright holders; thus the decision could well be made in the favour of copyright 
holders. However, the freedom of expression and parody was favoured. I agree with the decision 
as, even though the themes can be seen as offending (even significantly) copyrights of Mercis 
and Bruna, favouring the freedom of expression in this case sets an example that parody can be 
even shocking or disturbing and still be in line with copyright law. Making a decision any dif-
ferently would probably have a chilling effect on creation of parodies, at least in the case of 
cartoons and probably other works as well, which would not be a welcome development. 
 
Judging on this case, in the Netherlands parody and the freedom of expression, at least in car-
toons, seem to be favoured highly as opposed to copyright. Probably, one could draw an analogy 
that the favouring in similar cases would be seen also in other visual and textual creative works, 
such as parody films and books. 
                                                 
147 Guibault JIPITEC 2011, p. 237-238. 
148 Guibault JIPITEC 2011, p. 237-238. 
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4.1.4 United Kingdom 
 
In the UK there is an express parody exception, which came into force after Deckmyn in 1 Oc-
tober 2014149. Before this exception was set out there were some earlier cases in the British case 
law which seemed to demonstrate that a creator of parody would not be responsible for copyright 
infringement despite having taken a large part of an existing original work to make the parody 
if they had devoted adequate mental labour to what they had taken ‘so as to render her parody 
an original work’. In Glyn v Weston Feature Films it was established that the defendant had 
devoted adequate mental labour so as to produce an original work.  
 
The same outcome was concluded in Joy Music v Sunday Pictorial Newspapers which entailed 
a parody of a successful song called ‘Rock-a-Billy’. The parody, of which purpose was to be in 
support of Prince Philip’s activities who had faced criticism in other areas, employed the words 
‘‘Rock-a-Philip, rock’ in the way similar to the words ‘Rock-a-Billy, rock’ in the original work’s 
chorus. There was considered to be no copyright infringement by the creator of the parody as 
the parody ‘was produced by sufficient new work’ and thus was not a reproduction of the orig-
inal work. 
 
However, the view taken on these two cases was discarded in latter case law. In Schweppes v 
Wellingtons, the judge regarded the test (condition) used in Joy Music to be incorrect and the 
sole test was whether the creator of parody had ‘reproduced a substantial part of the original 
copyright work’. This approach was later accepted in Williamson Music v Pearson Partnership. 
The current position (2015) according to Lee is that in evaluating whether a parody constitutes 
an infringement of the original work’s copyright, it should be treated the same way as other 
types of possibly infringing works.150  
 
This constituted a major change to the earlier position taken in Glyn and Joy Music. The latter 
approach meant that parody had no special position when it comes to copyright issues. It threat-
ened to take the usage of parody as an art form almost to no existence as it is in the core of 
                                                 
149 Lee CREATe Working Paper 2015, p. 112. 
150 Lee CREATe Working Paper 2015, p. 112. 
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parody to take substantial parts of the work for the audience to recognise what work it is paro-
dying. There is no point in making a parody if it is not allowed to take major parts of the original 
work and if it is vague that it is a parody and essentially what it is parodying.  
 
However, when these cases were decided, the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA) 
did not include an express statutory exception for parody. After these cases, one such an excep-
tion has been added (in force in 1st October 2014).151 The exception is found in the CDPA 30(1) 
and states 
 
“Fair dealing with a work for the purposes of caricature, parody or pastiche does not infringe 
copyright in the work.” 
 
Here again we can see the mention of caricature and pastiche in the same context with parody. 
However, the UK Government decided to not to include no statutory definitions for these 
terms.152 There are always risks involved when crucial terms are not defined in the legislation 
as this can cause insecurity what the law is referring to when it is regulating about a specific 
issue. However, a definition has been provided in the UK’s Intellectual Property Office’s (IPO) 
Guidance leaflet: ‘In broad terms, parody imitates a work for humorous or satirical effect, com-
menting on the original work, its subject, author, style, or some other target.’153 One must note 
that Deckmyn already provided a definition for the parody before the provision came into force 
but the IPO’s definition does not seem to add any additional conditions to the ECJ’s definition 
and in this way seems to be unproblematic.  
 
There is no statutory definition for fair dealing, but the IPO mentions in its leaflet factors that 
have been determined by the courts in assessing whether a particular dealing with a work is 
considered fair: 
 
1) ‘Does using the work affect the market for the original work?’ 
                                                 
151 Lee CREATe Working Paper 2015, pp. 111-112. 
152 Lee CREATe Working Paper 2015, p. 113. 
153 Intellectual Property Office 2014, p. 8. 
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2) ‘Is the amount of the work taken reasonable and appropriate? Was it necessary to use the 
amount that was taken?’154 
 
However, it can be argued that the fair dealing condition is especially problematic in regards to 
the ECJ’s definition as the British parody exception came into force after Deckmyn. As has been 
argued in this paper, these kinds of additional conditions are not likely to be applicable in the 
EU Member States.  
 
4.1.5 Comparisons 
 
Out of these four example states, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have set out 
an express parody exception into their copyright laws as the EU law permits. The only state out 
of these four that has not set out an express parody exception is Finland. Two states’ (France 
and the Netherlands) exceptions had come into force before Deckmyn, one (the UK) after it. In 
Finland, the legal academia has considered parody as being a part of conversion done in free 
association or sometimes falling under the quotation right. This is a different approach to parody 
compared to the other three states. 
 
There are differences as to the number of conditions that the four countries have for parody. 
While France has five conditions, Finland has two and the Netherlands and the UK one. Addi-
tional conditions that are in the laws of France, the Netherlands and the UK in relation to the 
conditions in the ECJ definition and similarities between the conditions of parody in the Finnish 
law and the conditions in the ECJ definition are considered next.  
 
Additional conditions that French legislation has for parody in relation to the ECJ definition, 
are 1) it has to observe the rules of the genre and 2) it must not cause harm to the author of the 
original work.  The only condition that exists in Dutch law is also an additional one to the ECJ 
definition (the use must be is in accordance with what social custom regards as reasonably ac-
ceptable). In the United Kingdom, the only condition is also an addition to the ECJ definition 
(it must be done in fair dealing). The conditions that exist in the Finnish law for parody (it has 
                                                 
154 Intellectual Property Office 2014, p. 10. 
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to be independent and original/new) is similar to the part in the ECJ definition which says that 
parody must be noticeably different from the original work. 
 
Thus, the French legislation has the greatest number of conditions for parody while Finland, the 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom have the least. All except Finland may be seen to have 
additional conditions to the ECJ definition (as the Finnish condition is very similar to one of the 
elements in the ECJ definition). It can be then seen that those countries that have set out a parody 
exception into their legislations may have additional or an additional condition(s) to parody in 
their legislations. What can also be seen from this comparison is that even though an EU Mem-
ber State (such as Finland) has not set out a parody exception, it may still allow a parody in 
other ways.  
 
4.2 Other countries 
 
In this subchapter an overview will be taken on the laws of three non-European countries, Aus-
tralia, Canada and the USA, to give a comparative perspective how parody and copyright is 
regulated outside the EU and to give ideas for the development of the EU law. As will be seen, 
the regulation differs from that of the EU law and the laws of the selected EU Member States. 
 
4.2.1 Australia 
 
In Australian Copyright Act 1968 (ACA), there is an express parody exception which was in-
troduced in the Act in 2006155. According to the Part III, Division 3, Section 41A: 
 
‘A fair dealing with a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, or with an adaptation of a 
literary, dramatic or musical work, does not constitute an infringement of the copyright in the 
work if it is for the purpose of parody or satire.’ 
 
Furthermore, ACA Section 103AA (as amended) states:  
                                                 
155 Mendis and Kretschmer 2013, p. 24. 
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‘A fair dealing with an audio-visual item does not constitute an infringement of the copyright in 
the item or in any work or other audio-visual item included in the item if it is for the purpose of 
parody or satire.’ 
 
Thus, a parody that uses a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work or an audio-visual item is 
not a copyright infringement if it is done in fair dealing. However, the Australian legislation 
does not provide a definition for parody (or satire). This has led to criticism from several com-
mentators.156 
 
In relation to Section 40, which considers fair dealing for the purpose of research or study, there 
exists a five-factor doctrine under Section 40(2) to decide when the dealing is considered ‘fair’.  
 
These are the following: 
 
‘(1) The purpose and character of the dealing;  
(2) The nature of the work or adaptation;  
(3) The possibility of obtaining the work or adaptation within a reasonable time at an ordinary 
commercial price;  
(4) The effect of the dealing upon the potential market for, or value of, the work or adaptation; 
and  
(5) In a case where part only of the work or adaptation is reproduced – the amount and substan-
tiality of the part copied taken in relation to the whole work or adaptation.’ 
 
However, such a doctrine is not assigned to criticism, review, news reporting or parody. Despite 
this Australian Parliament has recommended and it is extensively presumed that the doctrine 
applies to all fair dealing exceptions (nowadays including parody). After all, the exception ex-
plicitly mentions that the dealing of the copyright work has to be fair.157  
 
 
 
                                                 
156 Spies 2006, p. 1130. 
157 Mendis and Kretschmer 2013, p. 24. 
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4.2.2 Canada 
 
In Canadian Copyright Act (CCA) there is an express parody exception. According to Section 
29: 
 
‘Fair dealing for the purpose of research, private study, education, parody or satire does not 
infringe copyright.’ 
 
Here one can notice at least two similarities to Australian copyright regulation. First, both par-
ody and satire are explicitly mentioned. Secondly, the article imposes the condition of fair deal-
ing for parody. If parody is done in fair dealing, it does not infringe copyright. Furthermore, 
there is no definition of parody in the CCA as was the situation with Australian law as well. 
 
In addition to this, there is a provision in the CCA that sets out the conditions for allowing user-
generated content which may include parodies that are not considered to be under the fair deal-
ing exception.158 It contains several conditions for these kinds of works. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
158 According to Section 29.21:  
 
‘It is not an infringement of copyright for an individual to use an existing work or other subject-matter or copy of 
one, which has been published or otherwise made available to the public, in the creation of a new work or other 
subject-matter in which copyright subsists and for the individual — or, with the individual’s authorization, a mem-
ber of their household — to use the new work or other subject-matter or to authorize an intermediary to disseminate 
it, if 
 
    (a) the use of, or the authorization to disseminate, the new work or other subject-matter is done solely for non-
commercial purposes; 
    (b) the source — and, if given in the source, the name of the author, performer, maker or broadcaster — of the 
existing work or other subject-matter or copy of it are mentioned, if it is reasonable in the circumstances to do so; 
    (c) the individual had reasonable grounds to believe that the existing work or other subject-matter or copy of it, 
as the case may be, was not infringing copyright; and 
    (d) the use of, or the authorization to disseminate, the new work or other subject-matter does not have a substan-
tial adverse effect, financial or otherwise, on the exploitation or potential exploitation of the existing work or other 
subject-matter — or copy of it — or on an existing or potential market for it, including that the new work or other 
subject-matter is not a substitute for the existing one.’ 
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4.2.3 The United States of America 
 
In the US copyright law, there is not an express exception for parody159 but parody may be 
considered to be under fair use.160 The USA, then also has the fair dealing doctrine in its law as 
Australia and Canada do, but the difference is that the USA does not have an express parody 
exception. According to Lee, the most important judgement on the status of parody under cop-
yright law in the US is the ruling of the US Supreme Court Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music161.162 
In the case, the plaintiff was Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. which owned the rights to the Song ‘Oh, 
Pretty Woman’. A music group called 2 Live Crew created a parody of that song called ‘Pretty 
Woman’. Consequently, Acuff-Rose Music brought legal charges against 2 Live Crew and its 
record company Luke Skyywalker Records, for infringing copyright. The Supreme Court de-
cided that 2 Live Crew’s parody was under fair use.163  
 
The Copyright Act of 1976 Section 107 regulates about fair use under which copyright infringe-
ment is considered acceptable.  
 
‘Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, 
including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified 
by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including 
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.’ 
 
When it is considered whether an infringement is acceptable, the same section (107) states four 
factors to be taken into account: 
 
‘(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or 
is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
                                                 
159 Lee CREATe Working Paper 2015, p. 115. 
160 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994), p. 569. 
161 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
162 Lee CREATe Working Paper 2015, p. 115. 
163 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994), pp. 572-573. 
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(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; 
and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.’ 
 
In the case, the Supreme Court justified the decision with taking these four factors into account. 
With regard to the first factor, the Court stated that if use is commercial of its nature it does not 
automatically mean that it cannot fall under fair use. If such a rule existed, this rule would con-
tain ‘nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in the preamble paragraph of § 107, including news 
reporting, comment, criticism, teaching, scholarship, and research since these activities "are 
generally conducted for profit in this country”’.164 
 
With the second factor, the Court stated that the factor demands acknowledgement of the fact 
that “some works are closer to the core of the copyright protection than others”. This has a 
consequence of making it harder to show fair use when works closer to the core are copied. 
However, this factor was of no use in this case or not likely to help a great amount to distinguish 
between fair use and infringement in parody cases, because parodies very frequently copy well-
known works.165 
 
With regards to the third factor, the Court stated that when parody parodies a certain original 
work, it must be able to quote enough material from it, so the target work is recognized. What 
constitutes this recognizability is its most original or notable features which the audience will 
certainly recognize. Even if the copied part is said to go to the “heart” of the original work, this 
fact alone does not mean the copying goes beyond what is enough. By contrast, this “heart” 
usually is the most recognizable part of the parodied work. In this case 2 Live Crew had copied 
the opening riff and the first line and those could be considered to go to the “heart” of the orig-
inal. However, at the same time, they made many different modifications to the original song.166   
 
 
                                                 
164 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994), p. 584. 
165 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994), p. 586. 
166 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994), p. 588-589.  
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The court stated that the fourth factor  
 
‘requires courts to consider not only the extent of market harm caused by the particular actions 
of the alleged infringer, but also “whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort en-
gaged in by the defendant . . .would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential 
market” for the original.’ 
 
As to the harm caused to the original work’s market in the cases of parody, usually parody is a 
substitute for the original and they operate in different markets. Therefore, harm is not so easily 
to be assumed. Even though harm, in the form of decreased demand, could be caused to the 
original work’s market by ‘a lethal parody’, this kind of harm is not protected under the Copy-
right Law. The potential market refers to a derivative market that original works have; these are 
works that the original creators would create in general or license others to create. However, it 
is unlikely that licenses would be given to works that criticise the original; thus ‘there is no 
protectible derivative market for criticism’. The Court also concluded that harm was not shown 
to be caused to the potential rap market of the song.167 
 
4.2.4 Comparisons  
 
First, if we compare whether there is an express parody exception in the national laws of the 
countries, we find that Australia and Canada have an exception (as do France, the Netherlands 
and the UK) but the USA does not (as does not Finland). In the USA, parody is however allowed 
under fair use. 
 
Next, one can compare the conditions for parody, firstly, between Australia, Canada and the 
USA and, secondly, their conditions to the conditions of the EU and its Member States. The 
similarity in the conditions between Australia, Canada and the USA is that parody is allowed if 
it is under fair use (the USA) or fair dealing (Australia, Canada). If one compares this condition 
to given examples of EU Member States, only the UK shares this condition (framed as fair 
dealing). Thus, this condition is something that seems to be common among common law 
                                                 
167 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994), p. 590-593. 
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countries. When the conditions of these countries are compared to the EU conditions we find 
that there are no shared conditions. 
 
Furthermore, there is not a definition for parody in any of the three countries, thus the EU law 
differs in this perspective from the law of those as it does have a definition. One can, however, 
compare the similarities in the factors that are used to determine when the dealing/use is con-
sidered fair between the three countries. In Canada there are no established conditions for what 
is generally considered fair use (an exception is the provision that considers user-generated con-
tent). In Australia and the USA shared conditions are: 1) ‘the purpose and character of the deal-
ing’ (in the US law also commercial nature or non-profit educational purpose is taken into ac-
count while in the Australian factor this is not explicitly mentioned), 2) ‘the nature of the work’, 
3) ‘the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the work’ 4) ‘the amount and 
substantiality of the part copied taken in relation to the whole work’.168 The conditions are oth-
erwise the same except for the inclusion of commercial nature vs. non-profit educational pur-
pose to the first factor in the US law and one additional condition in the Australian law (‘the 
possibility of obtaining the work or adaptation within a reasonable time at an ordinary commer-
cial price’169). In the user-generated content provision in Canadian law, there is also one factor 
that is similar to the third common factor to Australia and the USA.170 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
168 Australian Copyright Act 1968 Section 40(2) and the Copyright Act of 1976 Section 107. 
169 Australian Copyright Act 1968 Section 40(2). 
170 Canadian Copyright Act Section 29.21: ‘(d) the use of, or the authorization to disseminate, the new work or 
other subject-matter does not have a substantial adverse effect, financial or otherwise, on the exploitation or poten-
tial exploitation of the existing work or other subject-matter — or copy of it — or on an existing or potential market 
for it, including that the new work or other subject-matter is not a substitute for the existing one.’ 
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Table 1: The ways parody is allowed in different countries and the inclusion of a fair use doctrine/fair 
dealing provision. 
COUNTRY EXPRESS PARODY 
EXCEPTION 
PARODY AL-
LOWED IN AN-
OTHER WAY, 
WHICH? 
FAIR USE DOC-
TRINE/FAIR 
DEALING PROVI-
SION 
EU Member States    
Finland - Yes, under a conver-
sion done in free as-
sociation or quota-
tion right provisions. 
- 
France Yes - - 
Netherlands Yes - - 
United Kingdom Yes - Yes 
Non-European 
countries 
   
Australia Yes - Yes 
Canada Yes - Yes 
USA - Yes, under a fair use 
doctrine. 
Yes 
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5 DEVELOPMENT PROPOSALS IN REGARD TO THE EU LAW CON-
SIDERING PARODY AND COPYRIGHT  
 
What are some issues that could be developed within the EU law what comes to the relationship 
between parody and copyright? When this kind of question is presented one has to take into 
account from which perspective one is looking at the issue? As has been established, both par-
ody and copyright have a connection to fundamental rights. Parody is a form of freedom of 
expression and copyright is an aspect of the right to property in the EU law. Parody and copy-
right can thus be seen to be in conflict with each other. Copyright can also be seen indirectly to 
advance or encourage the use of the freedom of expression because it enables the authors to 
receive a compensation for the use of their works. Considering the relationship especially be-
tween parody and copyright, if copyright was very strong as opposed to parody, it might en-
courage some people to make more creative works or increase the number of people making 
those but if the strengthening was done at the cost of parody, it would likely decrease the number 
of parodies made and make it more difficult. Thus, the argument of copyright encouraging the 
freedom of expression only works from the parody perspective if it is not done at the cost of 
parody. Thus, the relationship between parody and copyright is complex. 
 
Theoretically speaking, from a pure copyright perspective or a right to property perspective, the 
EU law could be developed in a way that would make it more difficult to make a lawful parody. 
This could mean that to the definition of parody would be added some additional conditions to 
the already existing ones. These could be for example ones that were suggested in Deckmyn by 
Vandersteen and Others. If taken to extreme, a possibility for setting out a parody exception 
could also be removed altogether. This is however very hypothetical thinking and arguably very 
few people would be supporting this as this would effectively remove a major form of freedom 
of expression from use. This would be unacceptable in a democratic society which needs a va-
riety of means of criticism for it to function properly. Secondly, it would be detrimental from 
the perspective of comprehensiveness of arts, as one significant art form would be banned. How-
ever, from a copyright perspective it would be beneficial to add additional conditions to parody 
and presumably there are many people in the creative industries that would welcome this kind 
of development. 
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From the perspective of freedom of expression or parody, the parody exception is already a 
positive development step. It is important to acknowledge in the EU law the right to set out a 
parody exception; this might increase the number of parody exceptions set out in the EU Mem-
ber States. It is also significant that the European Union gave a uniform definition for parody. 
This way those states that have set out the exception have to use the same conditions to consider 
whether a parody is lawful or not. Furthermore, there are no surprises in regard to the conditions 
of parody when making a parody of a work made in a state which has set out the parody excep-
tion. This increases legal certainty which is one of the general principles of the EU law171 and 
can encourage people to make more parodies of works which are made in another EU country 
further promoting the use of the freedom of expression.  
 
What could be developed, then, in the EU law from the perspective of freedom of expression or 
parody? At the moment, the EU has only established the right for the EU Member States to set 
out a parody exception; it is voluntary. Here lies the development possibility; the EU could set 
it mandatory for the Member states to set out the parody exception. Why would this be a wel-
come approach? It would increase the legal certainty in the EU and uniformity among the laws 
of the EU Member States. At the moment, one has to find out first how parody is regulated in a 
country whose work one wants to use for parody. This brings extra work on the behalf of a 
potential parodist and might discourage the making of parodies. However, if it was mandatory 
for all the EU Member States to set out the parody exception, this would make making parodies 
an easier process and a parodist would know for certain what the conditions of parody are. 
 
Furthermore, the ECJ definition of parody can be argued to be relatively well-formulated and 
as such one which is acceptable to preserve as the definition even if the parody exception were 
made to be mandatory. The definition is based on the usual meaning of parody which gives it 
credibility and makes it perhaps easier to accept even if one does not regard parodies positively. 
It is also wide enough and not too restrictive172 from the perspective of parody to enable the 
purpose of the parody exception to be fulfilled; that is to enable effective making of parodies.  
                                                 
171 C-183/14 Salomie and Oltean (2015). 
172 It would arguably be too restrictive, if the conditions that Vandersteen and Others asked the ECJ to give an 
opinion to, were to be added to it.  
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Another question that could be presented in the light of the overview on the legislations of Aus-
tralia, Canada and the USA which all have either a fair use doctrine (USA) or a fair dealing 
provision (Australia and Canada) in their laws: should the EU law adopt a fair use doctrine or a 
provision from the perspective of parody? Tapio argues that it would be beneficial to add a fair 
use doctrine to the European copyright law. He argues that continental European copyright law 
has been slow in reacting to fast changes. Also, the possibilities for courts to find new solutions 
to these changes are limited. He also argues that flexibility and reaction sensitivity are needed 
from the exceptions of copyright because of the technological developments and because of 
natural expansiveness of copyright. A fair use doctrine similar to the USA would bring this 
flexibility to European copyright law. He argues that then courts could take into account com-
petition and fundamental rights as well. Furthermore, European fair use would help to bring 
copyright exceptions closer together on the international level.173 
 
From the perspective of parody, would this fair use doctrine or provision174 be beneficial to 
adopt into the EU law? The ECJ definition is already, as was mentioned, already relatively broad 
(if we assume the humour condition to refer to a humorous intent) and does not set too many 
conditions for parody. Parody only has to evoke an existing work but be distinctly different and 
contain humour or mockery. Thus, it already allows flexibility in the case new forms of parodies 
appear; parody does not have to be in a specific form (for instance a technological format). 
However, as the ECJ definition is based on its usual meaning we could argue that if its usual 
meaning were to change, then a fair use doctrine would be faster to react to this. In this regard, 
I would argue that a fair use doctrine could be a beneficial addition to the EU law. However, 
one could argue that parody’s usual meaning is not very likely to change for many years as these 
kinds of changes take a long time to happen. However, in the case this kind of change were to 
happen, it would be beneficial for a fair use doctrine to exist. From the perspective of other 
copyright exceptions as well, a fair use doctrine could naturally be useful as well as it would 
allow greater flexibility, as Tapio argues. Thus, a fair use doctrine could be something that could 
be put under consideration to add to the EU law.  
                                                 
173 Tapio Suomalaisen Lakimiesyhdistyksen Aikakauskirja 2013, p. 41. 
174 These are referred together as ‘a fair use doctrine’ from this point onwards. 
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6 CONCLUSION  
 
The relationship between copyright and parody in the EU law is a very fascinating one. They 
are both strongly linked to fundamental rights, parody to the freedom of expression, copyright 
essentially to the right to property. Thus, there exists tension on a deep level between them. 
 
In the EU law, the relationship between parody and copyright is essentially regulated in the 
InfoSoc Directive and in Deckmyn. The InfoSoc Directive regulates that a parody exception to 
the rights covered in Articles 2 (right of reproduction) and 3 (right of communication to the 
public of works and right of making available to the public other subject-matter) can be set out. 
Deckmyn was perhaps the most important decision of the ECJ from the perspective of parody 
and copyright. It established that parody is an autonomous concept in the EU law and provided 
a definition for parody in the EU law. According to the definition parody ‘must evoke an existing 
work while being noticeably different from it, and - to constitute an expression of humour or 
mockery.’ It was argued in this paper that ‘humour’ refers to a humorous intent as opposed to a 
humorous effect, which is more in line with the freedom of expression.  
 
Furthermore, it was argued that adding new conditions on the top of the conditions of the ECJ 
definition is not likely to be possible by the Member States as this would, for example, reduce 
the harmonization effect of the ECJ definition. Some Member States still have additional con-
ditions for parody that existed already before Deckmyn. Applying them after Deckmyn can be 
seen to be problematic and it is uncertain whether this would be lawful. 
 
France, the Netherlands and the UK have set out a parody exception, while Finland has not 
where parody is allowed under a conversion done in free association or quotation right provi-
sions. Out of the other countries, in Australia and Canada there is an express parody exception 
in their legislations, while in the USA there is not where parody is allowed under a fair use 
doctrine. Australia and Canada have as a condition for parody a comparable fair dealing condi-
tion. 
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It will be interesting to see how the relationship between parody and copyright in the EU law 
will develop in the future. Will a mandatory parody exception be set out? Or will the develop-
ment turn in some point to favour more of the side of copyright? These are interesting questions 
and ones which the answers to will be left to see. However, it is clear that the strong tension 
between parody and copyright in the EU law will be left to stay because of their connection to 
fundamental rights. 
